Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-qsmjn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-18T04:17:42.976Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Humanity and Social Responsibility, Solidarity, and Social Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

JOHANNA AHOLA-LAUNONEN
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

This article discusses the suggestion of having the notion of solidarity as the foundational value for welfare scheme reforms. Solidarity is an emerging concept in bioethical deliberations emphasizing the need for value-oriented discussion in revising healthcare structures, and the notion has been contrasted with liberal justice and rights. I suggest that this contrast is unnecessary, flawed, and potentially counterproductive. As necessary as the sense of solidarity is in a society, it is an insufficient concept to secure the goals related to social responsibility. The discussion on solidarity is also based on a questionable sense of nostalgia. Furthermore, solidarity and liberal justice share essential objectives concerning welfare schemes; therefore, the question arises whether the proper comparison should in the first place be within justice and solidarity.

Keywords

solidarityjusticecommunitarianismliberalismsocial responsibilitysocial rightswelfare reformsbioethics
Type
Special Section: Responsibility, Vulnerability, Dignity, and Humanity
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , April 2016 , pp. 176 - 185
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1. Häyry, M. Precaution and solidarity. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2005;14:199−206.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

2. See note 1, Häyry 2005, at 202.

3. Prainsack, B, Buyx, A. Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics. Swindon: Nuffield Council on Bioethics; 2011.Google Scholar

4. See note 3, Prainsack, Buyx 2011, at 46.

5. Houtepen, R, ter Meulen, R. New types of solidarity in the European welfare state. Health Care Analysis 2000a;8:329−40;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMedHoutepen, R, ter Meulen, R. The expectation(s) of solidarity: Matters of justice, responsibility and identity in the reconstruction of the health care system. Health Care Analysis 2000b;8:355−76.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

6. See note 5, Houtepen, ter Meulen 2000a, at 336. Houtepen and ter Meulen do not specify what they mean by “justice,” but presumably—taking account of their critique, which will be presented subsequently—they refer to an intuitive European conception and not justice as found in American theories.

7. See note 5, Houtepen, ter Meulen 2000a, 2000b.

8. See note 5, Houtepen, ter Meulen 2000a, 2000b.

9. See note 5, Houtepen, ter Meulen 2000a, at 333.

10. Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; 1999 [1971].Google Scholar

11. See note 5, Houtepen, ter Meulen 2000b, at 357.

12. See note 5, Houtepen, ter Meulen 2000b, at 361.

13. See note 5, Houtepen, ter Meulen 2000a, at 333, 335. The notions are discussed referring to Émile Durkheim’s concept of anomy in terms of the loss of a common and shared morality. Durkheim, E. The Division of Labour in Society. New York: The Free Press; 1964 [1893].Google Scholar

14. See note 5, Houtepen, ter Meulen 2000b.

15. Macinture, A. After Virtue. London: Duckworth; 1982;Google ScholarSandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998;CrossRefGoogle ScholarTaylor, C. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989;Google ScholarWalzer, M. Spheres of Justice. Oxford: Blackwell; 1983.Google Scholar

16. These remarks are similar to, e.g., Rippe, KP. Diminishing solidarity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1998;1:355–74;CrossRefGoogle ScholarGutmann, A. Communitarian critics of liberalism. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1985;14(3):308−22.Google Scholar

17. See note 5, Houtepen, ter Meulen 2000a, 2000b.

18. E.g., Pasini, N, Reichlin, M. Solidarity and the role of the state in Italian health care. Health Care Analysis 2000;8:341–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19. This conditionality reflects Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s division between the social democratic Scandinavian welfare model with universal social security schemes—see Takala, T. Justice for all? The Scandinavian approach. In: Battin, M, Rhodes, R, Silvers, A, eds. Medical and Social Justice: Essays on the Distribution of Health Care. New York: Oxford University Press; 2002:183–90Google Scholar —and Central European corporatist schemes, in which social rights depend on the workplace and often view the family, not the individual, as a unit. Esping-Andresen, G. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity; 1990.Google Scholar

20. See note 16, Gutmann 1985.

21. E.g., Michael Sandel states that both conventionalist communitarianism and liberalistic rights-based theory neglect that which is good: liberals leave the good aside in prioritizing the right, and communitarians make the same mistake by prioritizing tradition. See note 15, Sandel 1998, at xi.

22. Sandel, MJ. Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; 1996, at 320–1.Google Scholar

23. See, e.g., Nozick, R. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell; 1975.Google Scholar

24. See note 10, Rawls 1999.

25. Sandel, MJ. Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality and Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 2005, at 213.Google Scholar

26. See note 22, Sandel 1996; note 25, Sandel 2005; and Sandel, MJ. Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 2009.Google Scholar

27. See note 10, Rawls 1999.

28. See note 23, Nozick 1975.