Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 6
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Goodwin, Donna and Howe, P. David 2016. Framing Cross-Cultural Ethical Practice in Adapt[ive] Physical Activity. Quest, Vol. 68, Issue. 1, p. 43.

    Johnson, Stephanie Butow, Phyllis Kerridge, Ian and Tattersall, Martin 2016. Advance care planning for cancer patients: a systematic review of perceptions and experiences of patients, families, and healthcare providers. Psycho-Oncology, Vol. 25, Issue. 4, p. 362.

    Goodwin, Donna L. Johnston, Keith and Causgrove Dunn, Janice 2014. Thinking ethically about inclusive recreational sport: A narrative of lost dignity. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, Vol. 8, Issue. 1, p. 16.

    Austin, Wendy J. Kagan, Leon Rankel, Marlene and Bergum, Vangie 2008. The balancing act: psychiatrists’ experience of moral distress. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, Vol. 11, Issue. 1, p. 89.

    Zellweger, Caroline Brauer, Susanne Geth, Christopher and Biller-Andorno, Nikola 2008. Patientenverfügungen als Ausdruck individualistischer Selbstbestimmung?. Ethik in der Medizin, Vol. 20, Issue. 3, p. 201.

    Zion, Deborah 2004. Caring for detained asylum seekers, human rights and bioethics. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health, Vol. 28, Issue. 6, p. 510.

  • Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Volume 11, Issue 3
  • July 2002, pp. 282-289

Relational Professional Autonomy

  • CHRIS MacDONALD (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 July 2002

The notion of “relational” autonomy—as described by feminist scholars such as Susan Sherwin and Anne Donchin—has been the subject of a significant body of literature over the last few years and has recently generated some interest within the field of bioethics. Although the focus of this interest has been the autonomy of ordinary moral agents, the analysis of relational autonomy can usefully be extended to apply to the autonomy of professionals, not only as individual moral agents, but in their roles as professionals as well. In this paper, I argue that professional autonomy, rightly understood, is relational in nature. This understanding of professional autonomy stands to improve our understanding of professional ethics, as well as providing a particular, concrete example of what we mean when we call autonomy “relational” and “socially embedded.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
  • ISSN: 0963-1801
  • EISSN: 1469-2147
  • URL: /core/journals/cambridge-quarterly-of-healthcare-ethics
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *