Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-768ffcd9cc-jpcp9 Total loading time: 0.382 Render date: 2022-12-01T17:32:29.311Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "displayNetworkTab": true, "displayNetworkMapGraph": false, "useSa": true } hasContentIssue true

States’ Equality v States’ Power: the Euro-crisis, Inter-state Relations and the Paradox of Domination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2015

Federico FABBRINI*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen

Abstract

This article examines how the Euro-crisis and responses to it have affected the horizontal relations of power between the EU Member States. It is argued that, whereas the EU institutional system had been designed since its foundation to strike a balance between state equality and state power, the Euro-crisis and the responses to it have increasingly upset this balance. A dynamic of inter-state domination is evidenced by the intergovernmental modes of governance within the European Council, as well as by the legal reforms in salient areas such as economic assistance, financial stabilisation and banking resolution, which have entrenched asymmetries between the states. In this article, it is argued that this dynamic constitutes a worrying development, given the anti-hegemonic nature of the EU integration project, and shows how intergovernmentalism paradoxically caters for powerful Member States. The article ends by considering options for institutional reforms, cautioning against the proposal to parliamentarise the EU and emphasising the potential of a new separation-of-powers system to restore a proper balance between the Member States.

Type
Articles
Copyright
© Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Conference on ‘What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone?’ organised at Tilburg Law School on 5–6 June 2014, and at the workshop on ‘Constitutions and Financial Crises’ held at the World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law (IACL) in Oslo on 18 June 2014. I am grateful for comments received at both of these events, and for those of the editors and reviewer of CYELS.

References

1 Fabbrini, F, ‘The Fiscal Compact, the ‘Golden Rule’ and the Paradox of European Federalism’ (2013) 36 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1Google Scholar.

2 Fabbrini, F, ‘The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in Comparative Perspective’ (2014) 32 Berkeley Journal of International Law Google Scholar 64.

3 Note that this article does not examine the changing relationship between states which are part of the Eurozone and states which are outside it. On this point see Piris, JC, The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU? (Cambridge University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Equally, the article does not focus on the inter-state implications of the use of enhanced cooperation. On this issue see Fabbrini, F, ‘Enhanced Cooperation Under Scrutiny: Revisiting the Law and Practice of Multi-Speed Integration in Light of the First Involvement of the EU Judiciary’ (2013) 40 Legal Issues of European Integration Google Scholar 197.

4 Bunse, S and Nicolaïdis, K, ‘Large versus Small States: Anti-Hegemony and the Politics of Shared Leadership’ in E Jones et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2012)Google Scholar 249.

5 Keohane, RO, International Institutions and State Power (Westview Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

6 The correlation between the size of a Member State’s population and its territorial dimension are particularly remarkable in the EU. Hence, eg in the Eurozone, Germany is the first Member State in terms of population size (82 million) and the third Member State in terms of territorial dimension (356,854 km²); France is the second Member State in terms of population size (64.3 million) and the first Member State in terms of territorial dimension (550,000 km²) and Italy is the third Member State in terms of population size (60 million) and the fourth in terms of territorial dimension (301,263 km²). For the data see EU Member Countries, available at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ [last accessed 18 January 2015]. In fact, factors about geography and population are also directly connected with the economic size of a Member State: eg, in 2013, Germany had the first highest GDP (equal to 3,635.959 billion USD at current prices), France the second highest (2,807.306 billion USD) and Italy the third highest GDP in the Eurozone (2,071.955 billion USD). For the data see, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx [last accessed 18 January 2015]. Among the EU Member States who are not part of the Eurozone, the UK stands out as a state with a large population (63.4 million inhabitants), a relatively vast territory (248 527.8 km²) and one of the highest GDP (equal in 2013 to 2,523.216 billion USD at current prices). See generally Alesina, A and Spolaore, E, The Size of Nations (MIT Press, 2003)Google Scholar (discussing optimal size of nations).

7 van Gerven, W, The European Union: A Polity of States and People (Hart Publishing, 2005)Google Scholar.

8 Lijphart, A, Patterns of Democracy (Yale University Press, 1999), p 42Google Scholar (defining the EU as an example of consociational democracy due to the consensus-based nature of decision-making).

9 See Fabbrini, S, Compound Democracies (Oxford University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (defining the EU as an example of compound democracy due to the constitutionalisation of a complex institutional architecture for decision-making).

10 Article 148 EEC.

11 Article 138 EEC.

12 Article 146 EEC.

13 Article 157 EEC.

14 Magnette, P and Nicolaïdis, K, Large and Small Member States in the European Union: Reinventing the Balance (Notre Europe, 2013)Google Scholar, Research Paper No 25, p 30.

15 van Middelar, L, The Passage to Europe (Yale University Press, 2013)Google Scholar.

16 See Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Decision 76/787/EEC: [1976] OJ L 278/5.

17 See Final Communiqué of the Paris Summit, 9–10 December 1974 (establishing the European Council).

18 Compare Martin, S and Zilioli, C, The Law of the European Central Bank (Hart Publishing 2001)Google Scholar and Baroncelli, S, La Banca Centrale Europea: Profile Giuridici e Istituzionali: Un Confronto con il Modello Americano della Federal Reserve (European Press Academy Publishing, 2000)Google Scholar.

19 Beukers, T, ‘The New ECB and Its Relationship with the Eurozone Member States’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review Google Scholar 1579.

20 Article 29(1) Statute of the ECB. [2012] OJ C 326/242.

21 Article 10 Statute of the ECB.

22 Article 11 Statute of the ECB.

23 See also ‘Lorenzo Bini Smaghi démissionne du directoire de la BCE’, Le Monde 10 November 2011 (reporting how after the appointment of Mario Draghi, an Italian, to the Presidency of the ECB to replace Jean-Claude Trichet, a Frenchman, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy demanded the resignation of Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, another Italian who was at the time member of the Executive Committee, in order to create space for a new French member to be appointed within the Executive Committee).

24 Article 10(2) Statute of the ECB.

25 Article 10(2) ECB Statute and Decision of the ECB of 19 March 2009 amending the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, ECB/2009/5: [2009] OJ L 100/10.

26 S Richard, ‘L’entrée de la Lituanie dans la zone euro et ses consequences pour la Banque central européenne’, Fondation Schuman Policy Paper No 338/2014 (explaining how the new voting mechanisms in the ECB will take off from 1 January 2015).

27 See note 14 above, p 8.

28 Plechanovová, B, ‘The Treaty of Nice and the Distribution of the Votes in the Council – Voting Power Consequences for the EU after the Oncoming Enlargement’ (2003) 7 European Integration Online Papers Google Scholar.

29 See note 14 above, p 8 (discussing the so-called ‘Lilliput Syndrome’ whereby larger EU Member States felt constrained by smaller states).

30 See note 4 above, p 250.

31 See also Piris, JC, The Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p 237 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Article 14(2) TEU.

33 Article 16(4) TEU.

34 Article 16(9) TEU.

35 Curtin, D, ‘The Irish ‘No’ to the Lisbon Treaty: Ireland’s Voice and Europe’s Exit?’ (2009) 7 Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften CrossRefGoogle Scholar 31 (explaining rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in the first Irish referendum and measures paving the way towards a second, successful, referendum).

36 Article 17(5) TEU (stating that, from 1 November 2014, the Commission shall consist of a number of members corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States, unless the European Council, acting unanimously, decides otherwise). But see European Council Decision 2013/272/EU concerning the number of members of the European Commission [2013] OJ L165/98 (deciding, in light of the concern of the Irish people with respect to the Lisbon Treaty reflected in the rejection of the Treaty in a first referendum, that the Commission will continue to include one national for every Member State).

37 Editorial Comments, ‘An Ever Mighty European Council – Some Recent Institutional Developments’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 1383.

38 Article 15 TEU.

39 Crum, B, ‘Accountability and Personalisation of the European Council Presidency’ (2009) 31 European Integration CrossRefGoogle Scholar 685. See also Curtin, D, Executive Power of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40 See note 14 above, p 13.

41 Ponzano, P, ‘Les institutions de l’Union’ in G Amato et al (eds), Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution (Bruylant, 2007)Google Scholar 439, p 467 (explaining that the Convention sought to limit the powers of the President).

42 Article 15(4) TEU.

43 Article 16(9) TEU.

44 European Council, press release, 19 November 2009.

45 See note 4 above, p 265.

46 European Council, press release, 1 March 2012, EUCO 37/12.

47 See eg Fabbrini, S, ‘Intergovernmentalism and Its Limits: Assessing the European Union’s Answer to the Euro Crisis’ (2013) 46 Comparative Political Studies 1003 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Curtin, D, ‘Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 Article 12 Fiscal Compact.

49 U Puetter, The European Council – the New Center of EU Politics (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2013), Policy Analysis No 16, p 2.

50 Smeets, D and Zimmerman, M, ‘Did the EU Summits Succeed in Convincing the Markets during the Recent Crisis?’ (2013) 51 Journal of Common Market Studies 1158 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51 For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the European Council and the other EU institutions see Puetter, U, The European Council and the Council: New Intergovernmentalism and Institutional Change (Oxford University Press, 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52 European Parliament Research Service, ‘European Council Conclusions: A Rolling Check-List of Commitments to Date’, study, 7 October 2014, PE 536.359 (reporting lists of actions the European Council required other EU institutions to take).

53 Fasone, C, ‘European Economic Governance and Parliamentary Representation: What Place for the European Parliament?’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 164 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54 Tallberg, J, ‘Bargaining Power in the European Council’ (2008) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies 685 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

55 Ibid p 687.

56 Ibid p 703.

57 See eg Dawson, M and de Witte, F, ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-crisis’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 817 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Maris, G and Sklias, P, ‘Intergovernmentalism and the New Framework of EMU Governance’, in F Fabbrini et al (eds), What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart Publishing, 2015)Google Scholar.

58 P Legrain, ‘Eurozone Fiscal Colonialism’, The New York Times, 21 April 2014 (arguing that management of the Euro-crisis has created a ‘quasi-colonial relationship’ between EU Member States) and S Jeffries, ‘Is Germany Too Powerful for Europe?’, The Guardian, 31 March 2013.

59 See eg Declaration by France and Germany at Deauville Summit, 18 October 2010 (requiring that budgetary surveillance and economic policy coordination procedures should be strengthened and accelerated) and European Council Conclusions, 28–29 October 2010, EUCO 25/1/10 (endorsing reform to strengthen budgetary constraints and enhance economic governance).

60 See eg Conference of press by Germany, France, Italy and Spain at Rome Summit, 22 June 2012 (agreeing to adopt measures in favour of growth) and European Council Conclusions, 28–29 June 2012, EUCO 76/12 (endorsing a compact for growth and jobs).

61 Paterson, W, ‘The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Center Stage in the European Union’ (2011) 49 Journal of Common Market Studies 57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62 The promotion of the Fiscal Compact and related policies of fiscal consolidation (ie austerity) as the main strategy to tackle the crisis is the most emblematic example of this. See Editorial, ‘The Fiscal Compact and the European Constitutions: “Europe Speaking German”’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review 1. Nevertheless, the argument advanced here should not be reversed: not all German economic preferences have been incorporated into EU economic policy. For instance, Germany strongly promoted the proposal of ‘contractual arrangements’, which aimed to bind EU Member States in fragile economic conditions to a detailed program of structural reforms in exchange for financial assistance by wealthier Member States – and the European Commission followed up on it. See Commission Communication, ‘The Introduction of Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument’, 20 March 2013, COM (2013) 165 final. But opposition by virtually every other EU Member State made the proposal moot. See Government of the Netherlands, press release, ‘Contractual Arrangements with EU Member States Not Binding, Says Rutte’, 20 December 2013, available at: http://www.government.nl/news/2013/12/20/contractual-arrangements-with-eu-member-states-not-binding-says-rutte.html [last accessed 7 August 2014] (reporting opinion of Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte against binding contractual arrangements imposed by the EU).

63 See note 14 above, p 40.

64 Puetter, U, ‘Europe’s Deliberative Intergovernmentalism: The Role of the Council and the European Council in EU Economic Governance’ (2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy 161 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

65 Hinarejos, A, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, ch 6 and Brunkhorst, H, ‘Collective Bonapartism – Democracy in the European Crisis’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal 1177 Google Scholar.

66 See generally Tuori, K and Tuori, K, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2014)Google Scholar, ch 4 and KA Armstrong, ‘The New Governance of EU Fiscal Discipline’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 601.

67 See note 2 above.

68 See note 1 above.

69 Craig, P, ‘Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications’ in F Fabbrini et al (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart Publishing, 2014) pp 28–29Google Scholar (speaking about the shift from legislation to contract).

70 See also European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries, P7_TA(2014)0239 (criticising the invasive role of the Troika in the EU Member States subject to an economic adjustment programme).

71 L Papadopoulou, ‘Can Constitutional Rules, even if ‘Golden’, Tame Greek Public Debt?’ in F Fabbrini et al (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart Publishing, 2014) 223, p 230.

72 See generally also Chalmers, D, ‘The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal 667 CrossRefGoogle Scholar (emphasizing capacity of the EU institutions to dictate to Member States policy reforms in a broad range of fields) and K Bush et al, ‘Euro Crisis, Austerity Policy and the European Social Model: How Crisis in Southern Europe Threatens the EU’s Social Dimension’, Friederich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis 2013 (discussing the threat that austerity policies produce on the welfare state).

73 Greece – Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, 3 May 2010, available at: http://www.minfin.gr/content-api/f/binaryChannel/minfin/datastore/a8/52/57/a85257bc11624aa0a2f89a6bebea2219687ce5f0/application/pdf/EU%2BBundle2.pdf [last accessed 1 June 2014].

74 Spain – Memorandum of Understanding on Financial-Sector Policy Conditionality, 20 July 2012, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/2012-07-20-spain-mou_en.pdf [last accessed 1 June 2014].

75 See note 57 above, p 839. See also International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx [last accessed 7 November 2014] (reporting that in 2012 Spain had a GDP at current prices of 1,029.279 billion euro, while Greece had one of 193.347 billion euro).

76 Article 8 ESM.

77 Annex I ESM.

78 See also Napolitano, G, ‘Il Meccanismo Europeo di Stabilità e la nuova frontiera costituzionale dell’Unione’ (2012) 5 Giornale di Diritto Amministrativo 461 Google Scholar.

79 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 2 March 2012, available at http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/304649/st00tscg26_en12.pdf [last accessed 10 May 2014].

80 Article 14 Fiscal Compact.

81 Closa, C, Moving Away from Unanimity: Ratification of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (RECON, 2011)Google Scholar, Working Paper No 38, p 11.

82 See also Fabbrini, F, ‘From Fiscal Constraints to Fiscal Capacity: The Future of EMU and its Challenges’, in F Fabbrini et al (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetory Constraints (Hart Publishing, 2014), p 406Google Scholar.

83 This is the most important decision-making procedure because it is the one to be adopted whenever a Member State is facing financial shortfalls which risk undermining the stability of the Eurozone. Preventing this scenario is precisely the statutory aim of the ESM. See also Calliess, C, ‘From Fiscal Compact to Fiscal Union? New Rules for the Eurozone’ (2012) 14 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies CrossRefGoogle Scholar 101, p 115 (stating that ‘there is a danger that the emergency voting, which should rather be an exception, turns into the standard procedure’.)

84 Article 4(4) ESM.

85 Article 4(7) ESM.

86 Significantly, in authorising the ratification of the ESM Treaty by the German Parliament, the German Constitutional Court was explicit in requiring that Germany takes step to ensure that its veto power be maintained in case new Member States access the ESM, and thus that the German percentage of control over the system does not decrease. See BVerfG, Case No 2 BvR 1390/12 et al, judgment (final) of 18 March 2014, para 193 (stating that ‘Germany’s veto position, which is required under constitutional law, will also be maintained under changing circumstances. Pursuant to Article 44 ESM Treaty, accession to the European Stability Mechanism requires a unanimous decision by the Board of Governors […]. This enables, and if necessary requires, the Federal Government to make its approval of an application for membership contingent on an amendment of [the voting rights system within the ESM] in order to safeguard the Bundestag’s overall budgetary responsibility.’) On this decision see also note 2 above.

87 Article 5(7)(m) juncto Article 37(2) ESM Treaty.

88 The ESM Treaty provisions which rendered Estonia’s participation to the ESM effectively irrelevant were challenged before the Estonian Supreme Court. See Supreme Court of Estonia, Case 3-4-1-6-12, judgment en banc of 12 July 2012. In its decision, however, the Court rejected the challenge upholding the constitutionality of the ESM Treaty. On this decision see also note 2 above.

89 Ginter, C and Naritis, R, ‘The Perspective of a Small State to the Democratic Deficiency of the ESM’ (2013) 38 Review of Central & East European Law 54, p 63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

90 Ibid p 65.

91 See text above accompanying nn 18–24.

92 Schiavo, G Lo, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism: The New Top-Down Cooperative Supervisory Governance’, in F Fabbrini et al (eds), What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart Publishing, 2015)Google Scholar.

93 Fabbrini, F, ‘On Banks, Courts and International Law. The Intergovernmental Agreement on the Single Resolution Fund in Context’ (2014) 21 Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 444CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

94 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, [2014] OJ L 225/1.

95 See Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund, 21 May 2014 (hereinafter SRF Agreement) available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%208457%202014%20INIT [last accessed 25 May 2014].

96 See note 93 above.

97 Article 11(2) SRF Agreement.

98 Article 3 Protocol No 36 (provisionally attributing to every Member State a number of weighed votes in the Council of Ministers). Because the Member States participating in the SRM are the Member States of the Eurozone, the total number of weighed votes of these 19 countries (as of 1 January 2015) is 224, meaning that at least 202 votes must be cast in favour of the SRF for it to enter into force. With 29 votes each, Germany, France and Italy, and with 27 votes Spain, are therefore necessary to reach the critical threshold.

99 Article 4 SRF Agreement.

100 Article 5 SRF Agreement.

101 Article 7 SRF Agreement.

102 See text above accompanying nn 18–24.

103 Gilbert, M, Surpassing Realism: The Politics of European Integration (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003)Google Scholar.

104 Eleftheriadis, P, ‘The Standing of States in the European Union’ in N Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2010)Google Scholar.

105 See Krasner, S, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

106 Posner, E and Sykes, O, Voting Rules in International Organizations (University of Chicago Law School, 2014)Google Scholar, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 458.

107 Article 23 Charter of the United Nations (recognising status of permanent members of the UN Security Council to the US, the UK, France, China and the Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation).

108 Article 12(5) Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (granting votes pro-quota).

109 See Halberstam, D, ‘Federalism: Theory, Policy, Law’ in M Rosenfeld and A Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2012)Google Scholar.

110 See Wood, G, The Creation of the American Republic (Norton 1993)Google Scholar and Rakove, J, ‘The Great Compromise: Ideas, Interests and the Politics of Constitution Making’ (1987) 44 William and Mary Quarterly 424 CrossRefGoogle Scholar (discussing the grand bargain struck by the US Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia).

111 US Constitution, Article 1, Section 3, Clause 1.

112 US Constitution, Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3.

113 US Constitution, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 2.

114 Schütze, R, ‘On ‘Federal’ Ground: The European Union as an (Inter)national Phenomenon’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 1069 Google Scholar.

115 Puetter, U, ‘New Intergovernmentalism: The European Council and its President’, in F Fabbrini et al (eds), What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart Publishing, 2015)Google Scholar.

116 This dynamic has emerged also in another intergovernmental context: that of the Eurogroup – which brings together the finance ministers of the Eurozone Member States, under the chairmanship of a semi-permanent presidency. The former President of the Eurogroup, Mr Jean-Claude Juncker, famously decided to step down from the job complaining that it was impossible for him to make decisions because of the way Germany and France were running the show. See B Parkin, ‘Juncker Says Ceding Euro Job Due to Franco-German Interference’, Bloomberg News, 30 April 2012 (reporting Mr Juncker as stating that Germany and France acted in the Eurogroup ‘as if they are the only members of the group’).

117 Dehousse, R, ‘The Community Method at Sixty’ in R Dehousse (ed), The Community Method (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

118 See eg Prise de position des Premiers Ministres et des Ministres des Affaires étrangères du Benelux à la Convention, 21 January 2003 (affirming opposition of the Benelux countries against the Franco-German proposal of a permanent President of the European Council) cited in note 14 above, p 19.

119 Dehousse, R, ‘“We the States”: Why the Anti-Federalists Won’ in N Jabko and C Parsons (eds), With US or Against US? European Trends in American Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2005)Google Scholar.

120 See also Craig, P, ‘The Financial Crisis, the EU Institutional Order and Constitutional Responsibility’ in F Fabbrini et al (eds), What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone (Hart Publishing, 2015)Google Scholar (emphasising responsibility of the Member States for the current EU institutional set-up).

121 See text above accompanying nn 37–46.

122 See Center for the Continuing Study of California Economy, California Poised to Move Up in World Economy Ranking 2013, July 2013, available at http://www.ccsce.com/PDF/Numbers-July-2013-CA-Economy-Rankings-2012.pdf [last accessed 1 June 2014] (reporting ranking of California in global perspective).

123 For the data see US Census Bureau, Apportionment Population (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/files/Apportionment%20Population%202010.pdf [last accessed 1 June 2014] and US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product by States (2013), available at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/gsp_newsrelease.htm [last accessed 1 June 2013].

124 Erbsen, A, ‘Horizontal Federalism’ (2009) 93 Minnesota Law Review 493, p 501Google Scholar.

125 Nelson, W, The Fourteenth Amendment: from Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine (Harvard University Press, 1988)Google Scholar and S Calabresi and N Stabile, ‘On Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment’ (2009) Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1431.

126 Valelly, R, The Two Reconstructions (Chicago University Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Ackerman, B, We the People: Volume 3. The Civil Rights Revolution (Harvard University Press, 2014)Google Scholar.

127 Shelby County v Holder, 570 U.S. __ (2013).

128 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No 109–246.

129 Shelby County, at 1 [slip opinion].

130 Fabbrini, F, Fundamental Rights in Europe: Challenges and Transformations in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2014), p 262CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also critically, JP Stevens, ‘The Court and the Right to Vote: A Dissent’, 60 New York Review of Books, 15 August 2013, 37, p 38.

131 See text above accompanying nn 66–102.

132 See note 61 above.

133 Scicluna, N, ‘Politicization without Democratization: How the Eurozone Crisis is Transforming EU Law and Politics’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 545CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Crum, B, ‘Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy?’ (2013) 51 Journal of Common Market Studies 614 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

134 See note 57 above.

135 Hirschman, AO, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Harvard University Press, 1970)Google ScholarPubMed (developing a framework to explain behaviours in firms, organisations and states based on notions of exit, voice and loyalty).

136 See note 14 above, p 31.

137 See European Parliament Resolution, ‘On the Elections to the European Parliament in 2014’, 22 November 2012, P7_TA(2012)0462, §1.

138 See also D Kelemen and A Menon, ‘Fight Club: When the EU’s Campaign Season Ends, the Real Political Battle Will Begin’, Foreign Affairs, 18 May 2014.

139 European Parliament, Result of the 2014 European Elections, available at: http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/election-results-2014.html [last accessed 7 August 2014].

140 European Council Conclusions, 27 June 2014, EUCO 79/14, §25 (proposing the election of Jean-Claude Juncker with 26 heads of states and government in favour, and 2 against).

141 European Parliament, press release, Parliament Elects Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission President, 15 July 2014 (reporting vote to elect Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission President with 422 votes in favour, 250 against and 47 abstained).

142 Weiler, JHH, ‘European Parliament Elections 2014: Europe’s Fateful Choices’ (2014) 24 European Journal of International Law 747 Google Scholar.

143 Hix, S, What’s Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix it? (Polity, 2008), p 162 Google Scholar.

144 M Maduro, ‘A New Governance for the European Union and the Euro: Democracy & Justice’ report commissioned by the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament PE 462.484 (2012).

145 Kumm, M, What Kind of a Constitutional Crisis is Europe in and What Should be Done About It? (WZB, 2013)Google Scholar, Discussion Paper SP IV 2013–801, p 19.

146 Somek, A, ‘What is Political Union?’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 561 Google Scholar.

147 Kocharov, A, ‘In the Image of State: Constitutional Complexities of Engineering a European Democracy’, in F Fabbrini et al (eds), What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart Publishing, 2015)Google Scholar.

148 C Antpöhler, ‘Enhancing European Democracy in Times of Crisis? The Proposal to Politicize the Election of the European Commission’s President’, in F Fabbrini et al (eds), What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart Publishing, 2015).

149 European Council Conclusions, 27 June 2014, EUCO 79/14, §27 (stating that to address the concerns of the UK ‘the European Council will consider the process for the appointment of the President of the European Commission for the future, respecting the European Treaties.’).

150 Kelemen, D, ‘Towards a New Constitutional Architecture in the EU?’, in F Fabbrini et al (eds), What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart Publishing, 2015)Google Scholar.

151 For the data see Eurostat, European Population by Countries (2013), available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001&plugin=1 [last accessed 1 June 2014].

152 BVerfG 123, 267 (2009) §§284–285.

153 Schönberger, C, ‘Lisbon in Karlsrhue: Maastricht’s Epigones at Sea’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal Google Scholar 1201 (holding that the standard of democratic legitimacy set by the court ‘is unable to account for federal states, including Germany’.)

154 Calculations are based on the data on the apportionment of seats for the European Parliament elections of May 2014 available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130308STO06280/html/How-many-MEPs-will-each-country-get-after-European-Parliament-elections-in-2014 [last accessed 17 April 2014].

155 Article 189 TEC.

156 See eg S Hix and B Højland, The Political System of the European Union, 3rd ed (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

157 See also note 148 above.

158 Council Decision of 25 June and 23 September 2002, amending the Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, 2002/772/EC, Euratom [2002] OJ L 283/1.

159 Piattoni, S, ‘Is the EU a Representative Democracy? The Normative Debate and the Impact of the Euro-Crisis’, in F Fabbrini et al (eds), What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart Publishing, 2015)Google Scholar.

160 Novak, S, ‘Les grand retour des Etats’ (2014) 149 Pouvoirs CrossRefGoogle Scholar 19, p 23.

161 A Gratteri, ‘Parlamento e Commissione: Il difficile equilibrio fra rappresentanza e governabilità nell’Unione Europea’ (2014) La Comunità Internazionale 237.

162 Martin Schultz promoted his campaign in Germany with electoral posters stating ‘Nur wenn Sie Martin Schultz und die SPD whälen, kann ein Deutscher Präsident der EU-Kommission werden’ [Only if you vote for Martin Schultz and the SPD can you have a German President of the EU Commission].

163 See also Bartolini, S, Restructuring Europe (Oxford University Press, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

164 See also note 145 above.

165 B Romano, ‘E’ Juncker il candidato PPE alla Commissione Europea’, Il Sole 24 Ore, 8 March 2014.

166 Editorial Comments, ‘After the European Elections: Parliamentary Games and Gambles’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1047, p 1048.

167 European Parliament, press release, Members Elect Chairs and Vice-chairs of Parliamentary Committees, 8 July 2014.

168 D Willis, ‘In New Congress, House Committees Will Carry a Strong Texas Accent’, The New York Times, 26 December 2014 (reporting how, in the 114th Congress from 2015–16, representatives elected in Texas, which is the second largest US state, will assume the leadership of six out of 21 Committees in the House of Representatives and indicating that, among others, representatives from California, the largest US state, held five committees, and the speakership, in the 111th Congress, from 2009–10).

169 See text above accompanying nn 66–102.

170 See also Fabbrini, S, Which European Union? Europe after the Euro Crisis (Cambridge University Press, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (making the case in favour of a new constitutional settlement in the EU based on separation of powers).

171 See eg G Papandreou, Foreign Minister of Greece, contribution to the debate of the European Convention, amendment No 43 (suggesting the direct election of the President of the European Council and explaining that this would ‘contribute to the substantial equality of the Member States.’) in Convention Secretariat, Summary sheet of proposals for amendments, 9 May 2003, CONV 709/03.

172 F Fabbrini, ‘Austerity, the European Council and the Institutional Future of the EU: A Proposal to Strengthen the Presidency of the European Council’ (in press) 22 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies.

173 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (TE Wick ed, Modern Library, 1982), p 351.

6
Cited by

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

States’ Equality v States’ Power: the Euro-crisis, Inter-state Relations and the Paradox of Domination
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

States’ Equality v States’ Power: the Euro-crisis, Inter-state Relations and the Paradox of Domination
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

States’ Equality v States’ Power: the Euro-crisis, Inter-state Relations and the Paradox of Domination
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *