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Economic Development through Treaty Reparations in New Zealand and Canada

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 May 2018

Myra J. Tait
Affiliation:
Thompson Dorfman SweatmanLLP, in Winnipeg, ManitobaMyraJTait@gmail.com
Kiera L. Ladner
Affiliation:
University of Manitoba, Department of Political Studieskiera.ladner@umanitoba.ca

Abstract

In Canada, Treaty 1 First Nations brought a claim against the Crown for land debt owed to them since 1871. In 2004, Crown land in Winnipeg became available that, according to the terms of the settlement, should have been offered for purchase to Treaty 1 Nations. Similarly, in New Zealand, the Waikato-Tainui claim arose from historical Crown breaches of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. In 1995, a settlement was reached to address the unjust Crown confiscation of Tainui lands. Despite being intended to facilitate the return of traditional territory, compensate for Crown breaches of historic treaties, and indirectly provide opportunity for economic development, in both cases, settlement was met with legal and political challenges. Using a comparative legal analysis, this paper examines how the state continues to use its law-making power to undermine socio-economic development of Indigenous communities in Canada and New Zealand, thereby thwarting opportunity for Indigenous self-determination.

Résumé

Au Canada, les Premières Nations signataires du Traité no 1 ont intenté une réclamation contre la Couronne pour la dette foncière qui leur est due depuis 1871. En 2004, les terres de la Couronne, à Winnipeg, qui auraient dû, selon les termes de l’accord, être offertes aux nations signataires du Traité no 1 sont devenues disponibles. De manière similaire, en Nouvelle-Zélande, la réclamation de Waikato-Tainui fut le résultat des violations historiques par la Couronne du Traité de Waitangi de 1840. En 1995, un accord fut conclu pour remédier à la confiscation injuste des terres de Tainui par la Couronne. Or, en dépit de l’intention de faciliter le retour des territoires traditionnels, de compenser les violations des traités historiques par la Couronne et de fournir indirectement des possibilités de développement économique, dans les deux cas précédents, les accords furent confrontés à des défis juridiques et politiques. À l’aide d’une analyse juridique comparative, cet article examine comment l’État continue d’utiliser son pouvoir législatif pour saper le développement socioéconomique des communautés autochtones au Canada et en Nouvelle-Zélande, entravant ainsi les possibilités d’autodétermination des peuples autochtones.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association / Association Canadienne Droit et Société 2018 

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