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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
In this paper I shall attempt to locate and articulate Aristotle's answer to a foundational question in the theory of action - viz., ‘what is the proximate (efficient) cause of action?’ This task is certainly of historical importance, since one cannot hope to understand Aristotle's interesting and influential theory of action without understanding his views on the proximate efficient cause of action. But the present project is not, I should think, of historical interest alone; for it has recently been argued by a leading figure in the study of action, Myles Brand, that What [proximately] initiates action?’ is the fundamental question in action theory, and we shall see that Aristotle has the makings of a very plausible answer.
1 Brand, Myles, ‘The Fundamental Question in Action Theory,’ Nous 13 (1979) 139CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Orexis (desire) is the genus of which epithumia (appetite), thumos (passion or anger) and boulesis (wish) are the species (DA 41262, MA 700b22, MM 1187b36ff., EE 1223a26-27; c.f. EE 1225b25f., DA 432b5-6). For the abovementioned properties of wish, see, e.g., DA 432b5, NE III.2-4, V 1136b7-8, Rhet. 1369a3.
3 Here we have a simple conception of a ‘basic action’ on which an action, A, is basic for an agent, S, at a time, t, just in case, at t, S is able to do A at once, without having to do anything else first.
I should also point out (as many others have done) that Aristotle's notion of something which is pros an end is broader than that of a means. E.g., a constituent of an end is pros the end.
4 In his book, Aristotle's Theory of the Will (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1979), Anthony Kenny suggests that we should understand ‘moral state' (ēthike hexis, ēthos) here ‘to mean any condition of the affective part of the soul’ (98). But, in his introduction to NEVII, Aristotle names five human moral states - virtue, vice, continence, incontinence, and brutishness (the contrary of which is superhuman virtue) - and two of these, incontinence and brutishness, are outside of the sphere of choice. The incontinent person, when he acts incontinently, does not act with choice (NE 1111b13-14, 1148a4-17, 1151a5-7); so those actions which are specifically representative of his state of character have no connection with choice. The person who suffers from brutishness has no reason (nous), at least when he behaves brutishly (NE VII 1149b27ff.), and hence lacks one of the prerequisites of choice (NE VI 1139a33-34).
5 We must not ignore Aristotle's assertion in the passage just reproduced that if the assumed end appears to the professional, or to anyone who deliberates, ‘to be produced by several means,’ he considers ‘by which it is most easily and best (kallista) produced,’ (1112b16-17). ‘Kallista’ is the superlative adverb of ‘kalos,' a term which is often used in a moral sense by Aristotle. (The noun ‘to kalon,' employed in the moral sense, means moral beauty or virtue.) And there is scope here for such a use of the term, as will become clearer later.
6 Cf. Ross, W. D., Aristotle, 5th ed., (London: Methuen 1953) 200.Google Scholar
7 I have argued elsewhere (The Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle's Causal Theory of Action,’ New Scholasticism [forthcoming]) that deliberation itself, on Aristotle's view, is a practical syllogistic process, so that choice too is linked to the idea of the practical syllogism.
8 701a13 (ek tōn duo protaselōn to sumperasma ginetai hē praxis) is ambiguous, since ‘ginetai” may mean either ‘is’ or ‘becomes.’ Thus, whereas the Oxford translation is ‘the two premisses result in a conclusion which is an action,’ we find ‘the conclusion drawn from the two premisses becomes the action’ in the Loeb translation. (We might note that a conclusion may become the action (in some sense) by generating it.)
9 Hardie, W.F.R., Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1968), 230Google Scholar
10 Burnet, O. John, The Ethics of Aristotle (London: Methuen 1900), 254-6;Google ScholarGreenwood, L.H.G., Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics Book VI (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1909), 50-1;Google ScholarGrant, Alexander, The Ethics of Aristotle, 4th ed. (London: Longmans, Green 1885), I, 265-6;Google Scholar and more recently Nussbaum, Martha Craven, Aristotle's De Motu Animalium (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1978),Google Scholar Essay 4 passim.
In his discussion of akrasia in NE VII.3, Aristotle sets out a pair of premises - ‘Everything sweet is pleasant'; This is sweet’ - and then adds, ‘and when appetite happens to be present in us; it leads us toward the object (1147a32-4). This mention of appetite may be taken to show that Aristotle thinks it possible that this premise ‘of the pleasant’ not be accompanied by appetite or any other form of desire. However, in such a case, it would not be a practical premise, but a mere motivationally powerless belief.
11 Cf. Modrak, D.K., ‘Aisthēsis in the Practical Syllogism,’ Philosophical Studies 30 (1976) 385–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
12 Anscombe, G.E.M., ‘Thought and Action in Aristotle,’ in Bambrough, Renford, ed., New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1965), 148Google Scholar
13 This view seems to be attributed to Aristotle by Anscombe, when she remarks (155) that wish or ‘rational wanting’ ‘should be explained in terms of what is wanted being wanted qua conducive to or part of “doing well,” or blessedness.' We might note that this view fails on a second count as well; for ‘we deliberate not about ends but about tōn pros ta telē’ (NE III 1112b11-12), and to wish for X for the reason that X is pros happiness - i.e., to form a wish for X on the basis of a desire for happiness and the belief that X is pros happiness - is to form this wish in a deliberative manner.
14 Aristotle's remark at NE I 1102a2-3, that ‘it is for the sake of happiness that we do all that we do’ (cf. 1097b20-21, reproduced above), does not show that this supposition is correct. We must ask in what sense we do everything for the sake of happiness. If the answer is that, whenever we act, we intend to do something pros the occurrently desired end of happiness, then it is surely false. A more plausible answer is forthcoming.
15 Richard Sorabji, in ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue; (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74[1973-74]) 112, adduces much evidence to show that the phronimos (man of practical wisdom) or the virtuous person - they are the same person (NE 1144b30-32) - has a conception of the good life which conditions his virtuous behavior: most notably, the phronimos deliberates not only with a view to particular good ends, but to the good life in general (1140a25-31), the best (1141b13, 1144a32-33). and happiness (Rhet. 1366b20).
16 When Aristotle speaks of the deliberating akratēs in NE VI (1142b 18-20). He evidently does not employ book III's conception of bouleusis as something which always begins with wish; for the akratēs does not wish for his akratic ends, since he does not think them to be good (NE V 1136b6-9, cf. EE 1223b7-8). However, he does not abandon the view that wish is a prerequisite of choice; for the deliberate decisions in accordance with which the akratēs acts are not choices (note 4).
17 Anscombe (146) has claimed that in VI.2 (1139b1-3) Aristotle speaks of an intermediate choice; hence the qualifying ‘(final)’ above. This point need not concern us here, and the qualification will often be dropped hereafter.
18 Kenny, Anthony, The Anatomy of the Soul (New York: Barnes & Noble 1973), 134Google Scholar
19 Cf. Anscombe, 147
20 Cf. Stewart, 250. Joachim, (Aristotle The Nichomachean Ethics [Oxford: Clarendon Press 1951), ed. by Rees, D.A.), 100-1)Google Scholar contends that the ‘pro’ here has ‘a temporal significance,’ namely that in settling upon ‘something which comes first in a series of means,’ we are selecting something ‘to be adopted before the other steps leading to the end.’ But Hardie (168) has correctly replied that this interpretation ‘is strained, as is not supported … by the parallel passages in EE 10, 1226b5-17, and [Magna Moralia) 1189a11-16, a24-31.'
We should recall in this connection Aristotle's remark that if it seems to the deliberator that his end may be achieved in more than one way, he considers by which it is most easily and best achieved (NE 1112b16-17). The deliberator will often select one path to the end in preference to others on grounds of ease and ‘goodness’ or ‘rightness.'
21 Wiggins, David, ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975-76) 42Google Scholar
22 This account is a simplified one; but it will suffice for our purposes. We may note that just as among people who ‘get drunk quickly and on little wine’ some get drunk more quickly than others and on less wine, some akrateis are weaker than others. Furthermore, not all akrateis are weak with respect to precisely the same things; and akrasia is not necessarily a permanent disposition: it is 'curable,’ or, at least, some forms of it are ‘more curable’ than others (NE 1152a27-29). On the possibility of an agent's intention being ‘defeated’ due to his weakness or akrasia, see my papers, ‘Pears on Akrasia, and Defeated Intentions' (forthcoming in Philosophia) and ‘Akrasia, Reasons, and Causes’ (forthcoming in Philosophical Studies).
23 The akratēs acts hekōn (voluntarily, intentionally, willingly), for he ‘acts in a sense with the knowledge both of what he does and of the end to which he does it’ (NE VII 1152a15-16). This point is consistent with Aristotle's view that, when he acts akratically, the akratēs is unable to do the continent action; for one can know both what one is doing and what one's end is in doing it - and so be acting hekōn - without being able to do anything else at the time. Aristotle's notion of acting hekōn is, in this respect, remarkably similar to the contemporary conception of intentional action as action which is done for a reason (see, e.g., Anscombe, , Intention [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1966],Google Scholar 9ff.). (Cf. my paper ‘Aristotle on Akrasia and Knowledge,’ The Modern Schoolman 58 [1981) note 16.)
24 Brand is here following Hector Castañeda, Thinking and Doing (Dordrecht: Reidel 1975). 280-4.
25 Nussbaum's ‘reason does not stop to consider at all the second of the two premises, the obvious one’ is more literal than the Oxford translation reproduced above. (The Greek is: tēn heteron protasin tēn dēlēn oud’ … skopei.) But Aristotle need not be saying that all second or ‘minor’ premises are obvious.
26 For a forceful argument that the suddenness of an action is not incompatible with its being chosen, see Sorabji, 111-12. Sorabji thinks that the biggest obstacle to saying that sudden actions follow upon deliberation is that ‘Aristotle defines deliberation as involving search (zetesis 1112b20-3; 1142a31-b15)'; but see my ‘Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle's Causal Theory of Action,’ Section II.
27 In the paper mentioned in the preceding note.
28 A similar conception of practical inference is defended by Goldman, Alvin, A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1970),Google Scholar esp. 99-109.
29 Cf. Goldman, 77.
30 At NE II 1105a28-33 (cf. VI 1144a18-20) Aristotle makes it a necessary condition of an action's being virtuously done that the agent choose it ‘for its own sake.’ However, his point is not that when one performs, e.g., the just action of giving P five dollars, that action is not virtuously done unless one chooses to perform the action simply for the sake of giving P five dollars, but rather that the agent must choose the action precisely because it is the just thing to do, and for no reasons ulterior to justice (see, e.g., NE IV 1127a27-28ff.; cf. Ackrill, J.L., ‘Aristotle on Action,’ Mind 87 (1978) 596Google Scholar and my ‘Choice and virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 [1981) 405-23).
31 Parts of Sections 1 and 2 of this paper were derived from my doctoroal dissertation, 'Aristotle's Theory of Human Motivation’ (University of Michigan 1979).
