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Canadian Journal of Philosophy Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Article contents

Immunity to Error and Subjectivity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Robert J. Howell
Robert J. Howell*
Affiliation:
Southern Methodist University, DallasTX75275, USA
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Extract

Since Sydney Shoemaker published his seminal article ‘Self-Reference and Self-Awareness’ in 1968, the notion of ‘Immunity to Error through Misidentification’ (IEM) has received much attention. It crops up in discussions of personal identity, indexical thought and introspection, and has been used to interpret remarks made by philosophers from Wittgenstein to William James. The precise significance of IEM is often unspecified in these discussions, however. It is unclear, for example, whether it constitutes an important status of judgments, whether it explains an important characteristic of judgments, or whether it merely marks an important characteristic of judgments. Nevertheless, reference to IEM abounds, making this obscure notion seem all the more significant.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 37 , Issue 4 , December 2007 , pp. 581 - 604
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2007

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