Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
The renewal of the Canada-US North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement in March 1986 will not end the debate on the relationship between NORAD and trends in American strategy, including the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This article reviews and explains the various strains of that debate. It points out why some in Canada argue that participation in NORAD will inevitably lead to Canadian involvement in the ballistic missile defence objective of the SDI. It also notes, however, why the military and other observers are concerned that strategic and technological trends in the US may make it difficult for Canada to remain active in North American aerospace defence, and indeed, even to provide for its own air sovereignty.
En mars 1986, le Canada et les États-Unis renouvelaient l'accord de NORAD, mais cela ne mettra pas un terme aux débats sur les liens entre NORAD et la stratégie nucléaire américaine, y compris l'Initiative de défense stratégique (I.D.S.). Cet article se penche sur les enjeux: d'une part, la possibilité que la participation canadienne à NORAD entraîne inévitablement le pays à s'impliquer dans l'I.D.S. et d'autre part, le risque que la stratégie américaine n'empêche le Canada de demeurer actif en matière de défense de son propre territoire, voire d'exercer dans les airs sa souveraineté.
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