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Note de recherche. L’effet Westminster : les cibles et les stratégies de lobbying dans le système parlementaire canadien

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 March 2016

Maxime Boucher*
Affiliation:
Département de science politique, Université de Montréal1
*
Département de science politique, Université de Montréal, Montréal, 3150, rue Jean-Brillant, Email: maxime.boucher.2@umontreal.ca

Abstract

This research note tests the hypothesis that lobbying activities in Canada are primarily aimed at the members of the executive branch. It uses the data of the Canadian lobbying registry to measure the number of contacts between lobbyists and public office holders between the summer of 2008 and the summer of 2013. The results indicate that the majority of lobbying activities are aimed at the executive branch. However, it appears that the House of Commons is one of the most popular targets of lobbying activities. In fact, empirical evidence shows that numerous lobbying organizations are engaged in integrated strategies that consider both the legislative and executive institutions.

Résumé

Cette note de recherche examine l'hypothèse selon laquelle les lobbies canadiens s'adressent principalement aux membres des institutions exécutives en raison des particularités du système parlementaire. Elle propose un examen du registre des lobbyistes qui mesure la fréquence des entretiens entre les lobbies et les fonctionnaires et politiciens canadiens entre l'été 2008 et l'été 2013. Cet exercice d'analyse systématique apporte une connaissance plus précise des cibles de lobbying au Canada. Les résultats indiquent que la majorité des activités de lobbying sont dirigées vers l'administration publique, mais que la Chambre des communes demeure tout de même l'une des institutions les plus sollicitées par les lobbyistes. En conclusion, il apparaît que les approches qui insistent trop fortement sur le rôle structurant des institutions parlementaires traduisent mal la réalité du lobbying. Les preuves empiriques montrent que de nombreux lobbies canadiens optent pour des stratégies intégrées axées sur l'intervention auprès des membres des branches exécutive et législative.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 2016 

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