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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
Previous literature has assumed that there is a trade-off between cabinet stability, by means of a majority manufactured by a single-seat plurality system, and the alleviation of regional conflict, by means of a more proportional electoral system. This study demonstrates that no such tradeoff exists. The objective of this study is to find an alternative electoral system which satisfies both the criteria of majority government and multiregional representation. In a quasi-experiment, an electoral system with a district magnitude of two (M2) satisfies both of the above criteria. The results of the study show that a district magnitude of two can provide a large diffuse party with a majority of seats for the same amount of voter support as the present plurality system. In addition, M2 rewards this large diffuse party with seats necessary to form a minority government at a much lower level of voter support than does the existing system. Thus, M2 solves the problem of underrepresentation of regions in the government party, and is at the same time even more advantageous to a large diffuse party than is the present electoral system. If the argument of this study is correct, beneficiaries of the existing system should not be averse to implementing it.
La littérature antérieure présumait l'existence d'un échange entre d'une part la stabilité d'un cabinet, par l'entremise d'un système majoritaire uninominal à un tour favorisant la création d'une forte majorité, et d'autre part l'apaisement des conflits régionaux, par le biais d'un système électoral proportionnel. Cette étude démontre que de tels échanges n'existent pas. L'objectif de cette étude était de trouver un système électoral alternatif qui pourrait satisfaire à la fois le critère de la majorité parlementaire relative et celui de la représentation multirégionale. Au cours d'une simulation, un système électoral doté d'une circonscription à deux sièges a respecté les deux critères énumérés auparavant. Les résultats de l'étude montrent qu'une circonscription à deux sièges peut permettre à un grand parti d'obtenir une majorité des sièges avec une même appui électoral que dans le système fondé sur une pluralité présentement en vigueur. De plus, la circonscription à deux sièges récompense ce grand parti en offrant le nombre de sièges nécessaires pour former un gouvernement minoritaire avec un appui moins élevé de l'électorat que ne le requiert le système présentement en vigueur. Par conséquent, la circonscription à deux sièges résoud le problème de la sous-représentation des régions dans le parti au pouvoir et est, par le fait même, plus avantageuse pour un grand parti que ne l'est le système électoral actuel. Si l'argumentation de cette étude est juste, les bénéficiares du système présentement en place ne devraient pas s'opposer à une telle réforme.
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