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Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Extract

Alone of the world's Communist leaders, Deng Xiaoping has charted a course that has combined for his country rapid economic development, successful economic reform and openness to the capitalistic international economy with continued dictatorship by the Communist Party. Under his leadership Communist rule in China has survived the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union-the motherland of Communism. In the process the regime has weathered the ending of the Cold War and has become more engaged with the Asia-Pacific region. But Deng's reputation at home and abroad has been badly tarnished by his ruthlessness in masterminding the Tiananmen massacre of 4 June 1989. But that ruthlessness is absolutely central to Deng's political philosophy and strategy. For him it is the basis of order at home which alone ensures that the economic policies of reform and openness can be carried out without undermining Communist Party rule through the spread of liberal influences. In so far as statesmanship requires moral dimensions it will be necessary in assessing the quality of Deng's statesmanship to consider the meaning of statesmanship itself.

Type
Deng Xiaoping: An Assessment
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1993

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References

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