Since the introduction of economic reform in late 1978, rural China has undergone an impressive economic transformation. On the one hand, decollectivization has culminated in the disbanding of the people's commune and the development of individual household farming. On the other, the re-emergence of the market has brought about a growing commercialization and industrialization of the rural economy.

The rural economic reforms introduced into China after 1978 have wreaked havoc on the accumulated scholarship of China specialists in the west. Dozens of books and articles that had revealed the inner workings of people's communes and the merits and faults of competing work point systems were reduced to historical curiosities by the decollectivization drive that swept the nation. In the wake of the demise of the familiar and fairly standardized pattern represented by people's communes, many questions arose for debate. How much of the collective system remained in rural China after decollectivization? To what extent did the revived system of family farming represent a return to pre-socialist organizational patterns, or was any resemblance to the past superficial and misleading? Was there a general pattern of village organization across the nation in the wake of decollectivization, or had uniformity completely given way to local peculiarities?

In their effect on marriage and the family, as in so many other domains, the reforms can be seen as having a dual thrust. On the one hand, by giving the land in long-term leases back to the family, and allowing it to invest in a variety of small and medium-sized ventures, they have restored something like the situation in rural China before the collectivization of 1956, when the family estate was the source of income and investment in opportunity for most rural Chinese. On the other hand, the reforms have been undertaken explicitly in the name of modernization, and the increases in both agricultural and rural industrial yields, along with the rise in household entrepreneurship, have taken China in some ways even further from the feudalism of pre-revolutionary days than it was during the collective era.

Decollectivization and the division of land have raised questions about whether a landed basis might reappear for a contemporary reformulation of patriliny in the Chinese countryside. This article addresses these questions by examining the processes through which formerly collective land has been divided and partially brought together again in informal, nameless co-operative groupings with an apparent patrilineal tinge.

Field-work in north, south and west China villages reveals that prior to the establishment of the People's Republic family organization at all three sites was characterized by the same customary arrangements concerning ownership of property, economic ties among family members, family management and family division. During the collective era and the present period of family fanning changes in these aspects of family life have been along similar lines. I was in a Hebei village for four months during 1986–87, and in 1990 carried out three-month periods of field-work in villages in Shanghai county and on the Chengdu Plain in Sichuan.

The story of the rural Chinese family household in the post-Mao period is generally told in one of three ways, which might be labelled modernization, tradition restored, and demographic determinism. Modernization parallels the family theories of classical sociology: economic development and education tend to undermine extended family living arrangements by instilling nuclear family preferences, while the relaxation of migration restrictions allows young men to seek their fortune away from home. “Tradition restored” sees collectivization as having undermined the foundation of the extended family household, the family economy. The return of family farming has, in this view, restored the conditions under which the extended family can flourish. The demographic determinisi view assumes that family preferences persist but that demographic structures change. Rising life expectancies and declining fertility should increase rates of family extension, since smaller families mean that there will be fewer brothers available to live with a surviving parent. Thus as the birth control cohorts come of age, the prevalence of extended households should increase.

It is standard practice, both within and outside China, to divide its population between rural and urban. However, this distinction is more complex than at first appears. China's State Statistical Bureau uses three distinct concepts when defining China's rural population. These have been translated into “rural,” “agricultural” and “countryside” definitions. A further complication is that the people included in each of these definitions has changed over time. As a result, data for China's rural population is ambiguous unless the user can determine which of the three definitions is being used and from which period.

There has been little systematic research on corruption in China. Analyses so far often only reveal various cases of corruption and conclude by commenting on the retrograde aspect of the Chinese state. Work of this nature also tends to be too static – not considering the historical and cultural dimensions of politics – and too superficial – just concentrating on anecdotal aspects of corruption. As a result, one could quite simply conclude that what is required is a Weberian bureaucracy, which would be both rational and efficient, though without explaining how this should come about.

However, in the light of works dealing with the shifting role of the state in societies which are undergoing change, the causes and nature of the phenomenon of “corruption” in China can be reassessed.