This article presents data on the gross value of industrial output (GVIO) by province for the years 1949–73 and shows their relationship to GVIO figures published for the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a whole. From the founding of the People's Republic on 1 October 1949 until the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Chinese statistical authorities made conscious and sustained efforts to copy Soviet statistical organization and practices. Consequently, the Chinese statistical system, as it developed in the 1950s, mirrored the Soviet system. Descriptions of the Soviet statistical system give valuable insights into the functioning of the Chinese system, and an understanding of problems noted in western studies of Soviet statistics has often been important to an understanding of statistical data from China.

Observers of the current Chinese scene have found the anti-Confucian campaign which dominated the Chinese press from the autumn of 1973 through 1974 to be extremely puzzling. At one level, most observers agree that the attack on Confucianism was what it appeared to be – a continuation of the communist effort to eradicate traditional habits and attitudes that have persisted despite the revolution. It was a campaign against elitism, bureaucratism, scorn of physical labour, and the inferior condition of women. Most important, it was the rejection of the Confucian values of idealism, humanism and conservatism.

One of the more intriguing features of Chinese foreign policy has been the continuity of Peking's effort to maintain good relations with Pakistan despite the periodic upheavals in Chinese domestic politics and the alterations between moderation and militancy in China's policies towards the outside world. Although the goals of China's foreign policy – the recovery of Taiwan, the elimination (or the neutralization) of hostile military power from nearby areas, and the enhancement of China's status and influence in the world – have remained the same since 1950, changing international conditions and evolving Chinese perceptions have led to dramatic shifts in Peking's policies and in its relations with other powers. Former friends have become enemies and former enemies have become, if not friends, at least less dangerous antagonists. Yet China's relations with Pakistan, while not always smooth, have evidenced a high degree of stability.

Before 1949, China used to consume a limited quantity of rubber amounting to only about 20,000 tons a year. Today the People's Republic has emerged as a significant factor in the world rubber market. In 1972, with the import of 190,000 tons, all from South-east Asia – a region which produces over 90 per cent of the world's supply, China absorbed 7 per cent of the world's traded rubber. China's purchases rank her above such traditionally large rubber consumers as Britain. The importance of China in the rubber trade is reflected not only in her rapidly growing share in the world market, but also in her potential as either a stabilizing or de-stabilizing force on rubber prices. For years China has followed an erratic buying pattern, and on many occasions her sudden entry and withdrawal created a “stir” in the market, especially in Malaysia and Singapore.

I paid a two-week visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (or North Korea) in April–May last year. Being a Sinologist by training, the standards I used to evaluate what I saw there were those of a person steeped in the study of Mao's China. If I had brought with me a background in Soviet or Japanese and, most importantly, Korean studies, I would have had more insight into the distinctive characteristics of the Korean road to socialism. But the contrasts between North Korea and China are so startling in many fields and the implications for the wider study of socialist societies so important that I intend to couch this paper in terms of a comparison between the two systems.

From 26 December 1972 to 24 January 1973, I was a member of a group from the University of Hawaii visiting various institutions of higher learning in China. The group consisted of five Chinese-speaking faculty members and five graduate students with varied interests and specializations. Since my own particular subject is the training and political education of cadres, I requested permission to visit a May Seventh cadre school. This report examines the May Seventh Cadre School for Eastern Peking and is based upon information gathered on a visit there in January 1973. Officials of the school told us that from its establishment, on 7 November 1968, to January 1973, approximately 3,300 cadres from eastern Peking graduated from the school. The extent of this particular school's involvement in training cadres for eastern Peking is best illustrated by the public disclosure that over half of the cadres in eastern Peking have attended it.