Criteria of fallacy and sophistry for use in the analysis of Platonic dialogues

¹ See the remarks of G. Vlastos, C. C. W. Taylor, M. A. Stewart and I. M. Crombie, quoted in this paper (see below, pp. 363, 369–70, 373). For the contrary view see Sprague, R. K., Plato's Use of Fallacy (London, 1962); and Sophistry', Plato's, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 51 (1977), 45–61; and Klosko, G., ‘Toward a Consistent Interpretation of the Protagoras’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (1979). See also note 24, below.

² cf. the remarks of Sprague, , Plato's Use of Fallacy 81.

³ Vlastos, G., ‘The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras’, in Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973), 223 n. 5. Vlastos' position is endorsed by Irwin, T., Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977), 293 n. 1.

⁴ In Taylor's, words (Plato: Protagoras [Oxford, 1976], 119), Vlastos' interpretation ‘requires the reader to read an enormous amount into the text without any guidance’. See esp. Vlastos, , Platonic Studies 253, where the ‘surface grammar’ of portions of the text must be set aside.

⁵ It should be noted that the argument of this paper does not require that Socrates does use sophistry, but only that he could conceivably do so.

⁶ See , Aristotle, EE 1216b6; , Xenophon, Mem. 4. 2. 20.

⁷ See EN 1129a5–16; 1140b22–25; Metaph. 1025a6–13.

⁸ Irwin, , Plato: Gorgias (Oxford, 1979), 127.

⁹ See Taylor, , Protagoras 150–61.

¹⁰ See esp. Vlastos, ‘The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides’, rpt. in R. E. Allen, ed., Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1965); a partial list of articles on this controversy is found in Vlastos, , Platonic Studies 361–2.

¹¹ e.g., ‘Now if this is all we had to go by, [(1)] in the first step, and [(2)] in the second, could anyone say that the Third Man Argument was logically valid? Clearly there must have been something more in Plato's mind than the information supplied at [(1)], which made the transition to[(2)] appear to him not only permissible but plausible. What could this be?’ (Vlastos, , ‘The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides’, 236). See also ‘The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras’, 242 and n. 57.

¹² , Taylor sees the proof at Prt. 351b–360e along these lines (Protagoras, 191–2).

¹³ To cite one particularly unusual construal of an argument, Vlastos holds that the third man argument is logically valid, but in ‘a very odd way’. He reads its structure as something like: (A1+A2+A3) →B, where A2 and A3 are tacit premises, which, Vlastos holds, contradict one another. And so the conclusion of the argument follows from the premises, ‘for we are working with inconsistent premises…and we should not be surprised to see them justify all kinds of contradictory conclusions’ (‘The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides’, 239).

¹⁴ Robinson, R., Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1953), 7.

¹⁵ Following Robinson; Robinson gives a good brief account of the elenchos (loc. cit.).

¹⁶ Ibid. Ch. 5, 49–60.

¹⁷ Ibid. 7.

¹⁸ e.g. Rep. 354a; Charm. 172a; Gorg. 507c.

¹⁹ In the following paragraphs I speak of Socrates and Charicles as having perceptions and pursuing trains of thought. It should be made clear that their ‘behaviour’ is only imputed to them by the commentator, in accordance with what he takes to be the most likely reconstruction of their debate.

²⁰ For the sake of simplicity and clarity, I ignore various matters touching on the moral claims advanced in the proof, unless these substantially influence its logic.

²¹ This is a ‘tacit’ premise even though it appears in the argument. It appears in only a formal sense; the substance of (6.2a) is not stated.

²² For one set of circumstances under which the use of sophistry does not seem to be immoral, see Klosko, ‘Toward a Consistent Interpretation of the Protagoras’.

²³ Taylor, , Protagoras 158.

²⁴ See, for example, Friedlander, P., Plato, 3 vols., Meyerhoff, H., tr. (Princeton, 1958–1969), II, 19, 181, and elsewhere; Guthrie, W. K. C., A History of Greek Philosophy, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1962–1981), iv, 246, 195, 143–50, and elsewhere.

²⁵ See Robinson, , Plato's Earlier Dialectic 15–17 : ‘By addressing itself always to this person, here and now elenchus takes on particularity and accidentalness, which are defects. In this respect it is inferior to the impersonal and universal and rational march of science axiomatized according to Aristotle's prescription’ (PED 16). See also the articles cited in n. 27, below. Cf. the different, and I believe misleading, account of elenchos in Irwin, , Plato's Moral Theory 37–41.

²⁶ ⋯ γ⋯ρ ἓλεγχος σɛλλισμ⋯ς ảντιφ⋯σεως (SE168a 36–7): also 164b28–165a3; 170b1–3; 171a1–5; and in other works, e.g. An.Pr. 66b 11–12.

²⁷ ‘Eστι δ’ ⋯ σοχστικ⋯ς ἓλεγχος οὐχ ⋯πλ⋯ς ἓλεγχος ⋯λλ⋯ π⋯ πλ⋯ς τινα κα⋯ σɛ;λλογισμ⋯ς ώσα⋯τως (SE 170a13–14); see also Top. 155b7–16; SE 170b 12 ff. On the similarities between the elenchos and the more fully developed form of dialectic discussed in Aristotle's Topics see Moraux, P., ‘La joute dialectique d'aprés le huitième livre desTopiques’ in Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics, Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum, Owen, G. E. L., ed. (Oxford, 1968), esp. 304, 297–8; Weil, E., ‘The Place of Logic in Aristotle's Thought’, in Articles on Aristotle, Vol. 1: Science, Barnes, J. et al. , eds., tr. by the editors (London, 1975), esp. 102–3; Kapp, E., ‘Syllogistic’, in Articles on Aristotle, Vol. 1, tr. by the editors, esp. 40, 47.

²⁸ Ale. 1 118b; see 112c–l 13a, 116d, 118b; Gorg. 472b–c, 482b–c, 516d; Euthd. 293d, 295a.

²⁹ See esp.SE 164 b 25–27. Plato's discussion in the Sophist is similar (esp. 233a–235c, 268 d). One can surmise that Aristotle's simile, that victims of sophistry are like those ‘viewing from a distance’, is taken from Sph. 234b–c.

³⁰ See, e.g., Top. 161 a24–31. For two specific tactics recommended by Aristotle, see Top. 108a 18 ff. (ambiguity or equivocation); 156a7–157a5 (concealment). See Grote, G., Aristotle, 2nd ed. (London, 1880), 398–403.

³¹ To fill this out a little more, in general throughout the dialogues Plato's use of language is somewhat loose and imprecise. By employing sufficiently rigorous standards, one would be able to find fault with virtually all of his proofs. Accordingly, I think fallacy should be assessed in reference to the elenctic context. Fallacious arguments are arguments capable of being objected to, or, more properly I submit, arguments objections to which would require serious restructuring. If the objection were only to the precise formulation of some premise, or something along similar lines, the questioner would be able to recast the premise and make it satisfactory, without being forced to alter his argumentative strategy.

³² Stewart, M. A., ‘Plato's Sophistry’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 51 (1977), 21.

³³ Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, 2 vols. (London, 1962–1963), I, 26. Irwin presents a similar statement of policy in the Preface to his edition of the Gorgias.

³⁴ e.g., the position of Sprague (references in note 1, above).

³⁵ I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to James Whyte Stephens, Jonathan Barnes, William Gustason, and the editors, for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.