Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-56f9d74cfd-rpbls Total loading time: 0.176 Render date: 2022-06-27T14:28:43.527Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "useNewApi": true }
  • English
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie

Article contents

Analogical Reasoning as an Inference Scheme

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2021

Bernard Walliser ,
Denis Zwirn  and
Hervé Zwirn Open the ORCID record for Hervé Zwirn[Opens in a new window]
Bernard Walliser
Affiliation:
EHESS (54 Bd Raspail, Paris, France)
Denis Zwirn
Affiliation:
Independant Scholar
Hervé Zwirn*
Affiliation:
CMLA (ENS Paris Saclay, 61 avenue du Président Wilson, 94235 Cachan, France) and IHPST (CNRS, ENS Ulm, 13 rue du Four, 75006, Paris, France)
*
*Corresponding author: herve.zwirn@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions[Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Despite its importance in various fields, analogical reasoning has not yet received a unified formal representation. Our contribution proposes a general scheme of inference that is compatible with different types of logic (deductive, probabilistic, non-monotonic). Firstly, analogical assessment precisely defines the similarity of two objects according to their properties, in a relative rather than absolute way. Secondly, analogical inference transfers a new property from one object to a similar one, thanks to an over-hypothesis linking two sets of properties. The belief strength in the conclusion is then directly related to the belief strength in this meta-hypothesis.

Résumé

Résumé

En dépit de son importance dans divers domaines, le raisonnement analogique n'a pas encore reçu de représentation formelle unifiée. Notre contribution propose un schéma d'inférence général, compatible avec différentes logiques (déductive, probabiliste, non monotone). Premièrement, un énoncé analogique définit précisément la similarité entre deux objets en fonction de leurs propriétés, de façon relative et non absolue. Deuxièmement, une inférence analogique transfère une propriété nouvelle d'un objet à un objet similaire, grâce à une hypothèse d'arrière-plan qui relie deux ensembles de propriétés. Le degré de croyance dans la conclusion est alors directement relié au degré de croyance dans cette méta-hypothèse.

Keywords

analogyinductionreasoning modesimilaritytaxonomy
Type
Original Article/Article original
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , First View , pp. 1 - 21
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Canadian Philosophical Association/Publié par Cambridge University Press au nom de l’Association canadienne de philosophie

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alchourrón, C. E., Gärdenfors, P., & Makinson, D. (1985). On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50(2), 510–530.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bartha, P. (2010). By parallel reasoning: The construction and evaluation of analogical arguments. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bartha, P. (2013). Analogy and analogical reasoning. In Zalta, E. N. (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasoning-analogy/Google Scholar
Bird, A., & Tobin, E. (2015). Natural kinds. In Zalta, E. N. (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/Google Scholar
Bouveresse, J. (1999). Prodiges et vertiges de l'analogie. Raisons d'agir.Google Scholar
Boyer, A. (1995). Cela va sans le dire, éloge de l'enthymème. Hermès, La Revue, 15(1), 73–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davies, T. R., & Russell, S. J. (1987). A logical approach to reasoning by analogy. In IJCAI-87, 264–270. Morgan Kaufman Publishers. https://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/87-1/Papers/053.pdfGoogle Scholar
DeRose, K. (1999). Contextualism: An explanation and defense. In Greco, J. & Sosa, E. (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to epistemology (pp. 187–205). Blackwell Publishers.Google Scholar
Dupré, J. (1993). The disorder of things: Metaphysical foundations of the disunity of science. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Goodman, N. (1947). Fact, fiction, and forecast (Fourth Edition). Harvard University Press, 1983.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. G. (1965). Inductive-statistical explanation. In Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science (pp. 331–496). Free Press.Google Scholar
Hesse, M. (1966). Models and analogies in science. University of Notre-Dame Press.Google Scholar
Jales Ribeiro, H. (Ed.) (2014). Systematic approaches to argument by analogy. Springer.Google Scholar
Joyce, G. H. (1936). Principles of logic. Longman Green.Google Scholar
Juthe, A. (2005). Argument by analogy. Argumentation, 19(1), 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kraus, S., Lehmann, D., & Magidor, M. (1990). Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics. Artificial Intelligence, 44(1–2), 167–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Macagno, F., Walton, D., & Tindale, C. (2017). Analogical arguments: Inferential structures and defeasibility conditions. Argumentation, 31(2), 222–243.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Musgrave, A. (1989). Deductivism versus psychologism, perspectives on psychologism. Notturnoed.Google Scholar
Norton, J. D. (forthcoming). Analogy. In The material theory of induction. University of Calgary Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: Networks of plausible inference. Morgan Kaufman Publishers.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1969). Ontological relativity and other essays. Columbia University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomson, J. J. (1971). A defense of abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(1), 47–66.Google Scholar
Zwirn, D., & Zwirn, H. (1996). Metaconfirmation. Theory and Decision, 41(3), 195–228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Analogical Reasoning as an Inference Scheme
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Analogical Reasoning as an Inference Scheme
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Analogical Reasoning as an Inference Scheme
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *