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  • Cited by 5
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Baumann, Peter 2011. Empiricism, stances, and the problem of voluntarism. Synthese, Vol. 178, Issue. 1, p. 27.

    Nottelmann, Nikolaj 2008. Introduction. Synthese, Vol. 161, Issue. 3, p. 325.

    Nottelman, Nikolaj 2007. Is Believing at Will ‘Conceptually Impossible’?. Acta Analytica, Vol. 22, Issue. 2, p. 105.

    Nottelmann, Nikolaj 2006. The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 131, Issue. 3, p. 559.

    Clarke, Murray 1986. Doxastic voluntarism and forced belief. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 50, Issue. 1, p. 39.


Belief, Values, and the Will

  • Trudy Govier (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 May 2010

In this paper I shall presuppose that:

(1) logic and epistemology are disciplines which supply us with normative statements pertaining to states of belief.

(2) as such, logic and epistemology have implications concerning what we ought and ought not to believe.

(3) as such, logic and epistemology presuppose that there is some sense in which a person controls what he believes — some sense in which ‘can’ has a place in contexts where one comes to believe things.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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