Can I Cease to be a Person?1

2 “Being Selfish about your Future”, Philosophical Studies 32 (1977), 425–431.

3 Wiggins, David, Identity and Spatio Temporal Continuity (Oxford, 1967).

4 Ibid., 30.

5 Ibid., 69.

6 By “F and G are independent” I mean that neither F nor G is a restriction of the other, and that there is no third sortal of which each is a restriction.

7 I take this over (more or less) from Wiggins (46ff.). He discusses Aristotle's use of the term “psuche”, “soul”, and argues that it comes out tantamount to our use of the term “person”, so that one should say, not that Callias has a soul, but that he is one. I appropriate the term to designate a set broader than “person” does.

8 Ibid., 75.

9 Much more complicated. My version runs over fifty lines, has nested loops, and is recursive.

1 A version of this paper was read at the CPA meetings (Spring 1977).