Anotion employed very frequently by contemporary philosophers is that of the object of acts and emotions, as distinct from their cause. This paper assumes that the notion of objects of acts and emotions is viable, even though it has been plausibly argued that one cannot hope to pin down the notion with any generality or conciseness. I am concerned here with attempts to classify objects of acts and emotions, as a means to clarifying the logical behaviour of the notion. My purpose in the first two sections is to remove some obscurities in the classifications which have been proposed, without challenging their basic structure. In the third and longest section, I argue that this structure, though largely sound, does in fact stand in need of some modification if it is to be as useful as philosophers have hoped.
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