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Concept Possession, Cognitive Value and Anti-Individualism


Concept-individuating possession conditions constitute one of the fundamental, albeit rather unattended, polemical territories between Fregean and anti-individualistic standpoints. In this paper, I outline a compatibilist theory of cognitive value that encompasses both anti-individualistic and individualistic possession conditions. I argue that this general approach to the compatibility of Fregean and anti-individualistic accounts of concept possession suffices to call into question the claims that cognitive value must have deference and transparency among its fundamental features.

Les conditions de possession permettant l’individuation des concepts, bien que peu étudiées, constituent l’un des lieux fondamentaux de la polémique opposant les points de vue frégéen et anti-individualiste. Dans cet article, je décris une théorie compatibiliste de la valeur cognitive qui réunit des conditions de possession anti-individualistes et individualistes. Je soutiens que cette approche générale de la compatibilité des explications frégéenne et anti-individualiste de la possession de concepts suffit à mettre en doute l’idée voulant que la déférence et la transparence sont des caractéristiques fondamentales de la valeur cognitive.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
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