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Figuring Out How to Proceed with Evaluation After Figuring Out What Matters


I focus on David Gauthier’s intriguing suggestion that actions are not to be evaluated directly but via an evaluation of deliberative procedures. I argue that this suggestion is misleading, since even the most direct evaluation of (intentional) actions involves the evaluation of different ways of deliberating about what to do. Relatedly, a complete picture of what an agent is or might be (intentionally) doing cannot be disentangled from a complete picture of how s/he is or might be deliberating. A more viable contrast concerns whether actions and deliberative procedures are properly evaluated on the whole or, instead, through time.

Dans cet article, je concentre mon attention sur l’intrigante suggestion de David Gauthier voulant que les actions ne doivent pas être évaluées directement, mais par le biais d’une évaluation des procédures délibératives. Je soutiens qu’il s’agit d’une fausse piste, car même l’évaluation la plus directe d’actions (intentionnelles) implique l’évaluation de différentes façons de délibérer sur la conduite à tenir. De façon connexe, on ne peut dresser un portrait complet de ce qu’un agent fait ou pourrait faire (intentionnellement) en faisant abstraction du portrait complet de la façon dont il ou elle délibère ou pourrait délibérer. Il est plus viable de se demander si les actions et les procédures délibératives sont évaluées correctement en entier ou, plutôt, à travers le temps.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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