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  • Cited by 2
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Brock, Stuart 2016. Fictionalism About Fictional Characters Revisited. Res Philosophica, Vol. 2, Issue. 93, p. 1.


    LEE, BYEONG D. 2013. BonJour’s Way Out of the Sellarsian Dilemma and his Explanatory Account. Dialogue, Vol. 52, Issue. 02, p. 287.


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Finkelstein on the Distinction between Conscious and Unconscious Belief

  • Byeong D. Lee (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300004005
  • Published online: 01 April 2010
Abstract
Abstract

In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief. On his proposal, someone's belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone's belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone's belief is conscious if he has self-ascribed this belief without recourse to any evidence about his behaviour, and someone's belief is unconscious; if it is not conscious.

Résumé

Dans un récent article, D. H. Finkelstein propose une nouvelle distinction entre croyance consciente et inconsciente. Suivant cette proposition, la croyance de quelqu'un est consciente s'il a la capacité de l'exprimer tout simplement en se l'attribuant; sa croyance est inconsciente s'il n'en a pas la capacité. Dans cet article, je fais valoir que cette proposition est inadéquate, et je propose ensuite une nouvelle distinction. Suivant cette distinction, la croyance de quelqu'un est consciente s'il s'attribue cette croyance sans s'appuyer sur aucun ilement depreuve au sujet de son comportement; sa croyance est inconsciente si elle n'est pas consciente.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Byeong D. Lee , “Moore's Paradox and Self-Ascribed Belief,” Erkenntnis, 55 (2001): 359–70

Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception,” Dialogue, 41, 2 (Spring 2002): 279–89.

Stephen Stich , “Beliefs and Subdoxastic States,” Philosophy of Science, 45 (1978): 499518, esp. pp. 506–11.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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