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From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements*


ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the roles of motivational bases. Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for justified evaluative judgements.

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We are grateful to Anja Berninger, Roger Crisp, Sabine Döring, Eva Düringer, Julien Dutant, Peter Goldie, Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Federico Lauria, Anika Lutz, Adam Morton, Kevin Mulligan, Bence Nanay, Raffaele Rodogno, Sabine Roeser and Mikko Salmela for their very helpful comments on a previous version of this paper.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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