Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 1
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Myrvold, Wayne C. 2015. You Can’t Always Get What You Want Some Considerations Regarding Conditional Probabilities. Erkenntnis, Vol. 80, Issue. 3, p. 573.


    ×

Full Belief and Probability: Comments on Van Fraassen

  • William Harper (a1) and Alan Hajek (a2)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300009318
  • Published online: 01 April 2010
Abstract

As van Fraassen pointed out in his opening remarks, Henry Kyburg's lottery paradox has long been known to raise difficulties in attempts to represent full belief as a probability greater than or equal to p, where p is some number less than 1. Recently, Patrick Maher has pointed out that to identify full belief with probability equal to 1 presents similar difficulties. In his paper, van Fraassen investigates ways of representing full belief by personal probability which avoid the difficulties raised by Maher's measure-theoretic version of the lottery paradox. Van Fraassen's more subtle representation dissolves the simple identification of full belief with maximal personal probability. His investigation exploits the richer resources for representing opinion provided by taking conditional, rather than unconditional, personal probability as fundamental. It has interesting implications for equivalent alternative approaches based on non-Archimedean probability, as well as for equivalent approaches in which assumption contexts representing full belief relative to suppositions are taken as fundamental.

Copyright
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Francis Anscombe , and Robert Aumann 1963A Definition of Subjective Probability.” Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 34: 199205.

William Harper 1975Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals.” Synthese, 30: 221–62.

William Harper 1978a “Bayesian Learning Models with Revision of Evidence.” Philosophia, 7, 2: 357–67.

Bas C. van Fraassen 1976Representation of Conditional Probabilities.” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 5: 417–30.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Erratum