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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 April 2010
There is a well-known argument which is an attempt to show that all arguments in favour of determinism are self-defeating. Proponents of the Determinism-Is-Self-Defeating Argument (hereafter referred to as DISDA) claim that all pro-deterministic arguments, if successful, undermine rationality and epistemic justification. Indeed, the proponents of DISDA claim that since the truth of determinism implies that we cannot claim to know the truth of any proposition, then it follows, of course, that proponents of determinism cannot claim to know that determinism is itself true. Hence, the self-defeating nature of determinism.
1 For a defence of free and rational belief acquisitions, see my “Chisholm, Deliberation, and the Free Acquisition of Belief”, Philosophical Studies 46(1984), 307–322CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Paton, trans. H. J. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964)Google Scholar. Kant states: “But we cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its judgments; for in that case the subject would attribute the determination of his power ofjudgment, not to his reason, but to an impulsion. Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of alien influences. Therefore as practical reason or as the will ofa rational being, it must be regarded by itself as free.” Also, “[B]ut we have been quite unable to demonstrate freedom as something actual in ourselves and in human nature; we saw merely that we must presuppose it if we wish to conceive a being as rational and as endowed with consciousness of his causality in regard to actions…” (116).
3 Ripley, Charles, “Why Determinism Cannot Be True”, Dialogue 11/1 (March 1972), 59–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Ripley states: “[I]t is a logical consequence of determinism that appeals to justifying reasons and also the very concept of objective truth must be abandoned” (58). Also, see Wick, Warner, “Truth's Debt to Freedom”, Mind 73 (1964), 527–537CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Wick states: “All talk of truth would be utterly pointless if there was nothing to it but causal influences that induced me to say or think this, while causing you to oppose that…” (535). Also “the autonomy of intelligence, or of ‘reason’ as we used to say is thus the keystone of the whole edifice. What then does truth owe to freedom? Why everything, of course!” (537). For a critical response to Ripley's version of DISDA see Simon's, Robert “Should Reasoning Embarrass the Determinist?”, Dialogue 12/4 (December 1973), 680–682CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 Magno, Joseph A., “Beyond the Self-Referential Critique of Determinism”, Thomist 48 (January 1984), 74–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 Jordan, James, “Determinism's Dilemma”, The Review of Metaphysics 23/1, Issue no. 89(September 1969), 48–66Google Scholar. For a list of pre-1969 DISDA advocates see ibid., 48. The following are all post-1969 DISDA advocates or critics. Branden, Nathaniel, “Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and the Law”, Southern California Law Review (Winter 1969).Google Scholar Branden's defence of DISDA is similar to Jordan's. Dwyer, William, “The Contradiction of ‘The Contradiction of Determinism’”, The Personalist 53 (Winter 1972), 94–101.Google Scholar A critical response to Branden. Bold, David, “A Reply to William Dwyer's ‘The Contradiction of the The Contradiction of Determinism’”, The Personalist 54(Summer 1973), 284–289.Google ScholarDwyer, William, “A Reply to David Bold”, The Personalist 54 (Summer 1973), 291–303.Google ScholarSnyder, A. Aaron, “The Paradox of Determinism”, American Philosophical Quarterly 9/4(October 1972), 353–356.- A DISDA advocate, Snyder states: “[T]he Determinist Doctrine is inconsistent with their being proofs, conclusive arguments, or conclusive reasons for believing anything, and hence, trying to prove that doctrine is a self-refuting activity. This inconsistency arises out of the fact that the universal operation of physically sufficient causes would leave no room for the conceptual sufficiency of reasons” (354).Google ScholarBoyle, Joseph, Grisez, Germain, and Tollefsen, Olaf, “Determinism, Freedom, and Self-Referential Arguments”, The Review ofMetaphysics 26(1972), 3–37.Google ScholarYoung, Robert, “A Sound Self-Referential Argument”, The Review of Metaphysics 27 (1973), 112–119. A critical response to Boyle, Grisez, and Tollefsen.Google ScholarHasker, William, “The Transcendental Refutation of Determinism”, The Southern, Journal of Philosophy 11/3(Fall 1973), 175–183.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPopper, Karl and Eccles, John C.. The Self and Its Brain (New York: Springer International, 1977), 75–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also, Popper, Karl, The Open' Universe (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982), 81–85.Google Scholar Popper advances his version of DISDA by drawing upon the work of J. B. S. Haldane. Churchland, Patricia Smith, “Is Determinism Self-Refuting?”, Mind 90 (January 1981), 99–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar A critique of Popper. Popper, Karl, “Is Determinism Self-Refuting”, Mind 92 (January 1983), 103–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar A reply to Churchland. Colson, Darrel D., “The Transcendental Argument Against Determinism: A Challenge Yet Unmet”, Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (Spring 1982). 15–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Finally, see Stack, Michael, “Self-Referential Arguments”, Melaphilosophy 14/3 and 4 (July/October 1983), 327–335CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 Jordan, “Determinism's Dilemma”, 54.
7 I assume, of course, that in order for an agent to be free from causal compulsion it must be true that in a given situation he could have chosen to do (or believe) otherwise. I also assume that we can gain evidence for freedom (or the lack of it) through introspection.
