1 Hymers Michael, Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000). This is a substantial revision of a critical commentary presented at the Western Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings in Edmonton in October 2000. I would like to thank those present on that occasion, and especially Michael Hymers, for their helpful feedback and clarification. This version has also benefited from Jill Mclntosh's close reading. All page references appearing in the main body of the text are to Hymers's book.
2 Lewis C. I., Mind and the World Order (New York: Dover, 1929); Goodman N., Ways of World Making (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1978); and McDowell John, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
3 This distinction is introduced in Sosa's Ernest “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol.5: Studies in Epistemology (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), pp. 3–25.
4 Presumably by “an” understanding, Hymers means “my” understanding.
5 See, for instance, AQ: The Magazine of Simon Fraser University (October 2000), Frontispiece, and the article by Yosef Wosk, “The Philosopher's Cafe: A Conversation Whose Time Has Come.”
6 See Cohen Stewart, “How to Be a Fallibilist,” Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Epistemology (1988): 91–123; Lewis David, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 4 (December 1996): 549–67; and de Rose Keith, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” The Philosophical Review, 104, 1 (January 1995): 1–52.
7 The term is borrowed from James William, The Will to Believe (New York: Longmans, Green, 1897).
8 Elgin Catherine, “The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity,” Synthese, 74 (1988): 297–311.