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Intention et faiblesse de la volonté

  • Renée Bilodeau (a1)
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  • Published online: 01 April 2010

Akrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgement is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgement that conforms to her best judgement “all things considered,” the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show how practical and theoretical reasonings concur in the production of action, and why akrasia is a problem for the philosophy of action before being a problem for moral philosophy.

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Michael Bratman 1979 «Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will», Noûs, vol. 13, p. 153171.

Donald Davidson 1985b «Incoherence and Irrationality», Dialectica, vol. 39, n° 4, p. 345354.

Donald Davidson 1985c «A New Basis for Decision Theory», Theory and Decision, vol. 18, p. 8798.

David Pears 1982a «How Easy Is Akrasia?», Philosophia, vol. 11, p. 3350.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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