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Intention et faiblesse de la volonté

  • Renée Bilodeau (a1)
Abstract
ABSTRACT

Akrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgement is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgement that conforms to her best judgement “all things considered,” the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show how practical and theoretical reasonings concur in the production of action, and why akrasia is a problem for the philosophy of action before being a problem for moral philosophy.

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David O. Brink 1989 Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Richard Wollheim et Hopkins James , dir. 1982 Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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