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Knowing Persons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 November 2010

David Matheson*
Affiliation:
Carleton University

Abstract

ABSTRACT: There is an intuitive distinction between knowing someone in a detached manner — impersonally — and knowing someone in a more intimate fashion — personally. The latter seems to involve the specially active participation of the person known in a way that the former does not. In this paper I present a novel, communication account of knowing someone personally that successfully explains this participation. The account also illuminates the propositional and testimonial character of the personal knowledge of persons, the conditions of limited transferability to which such knowledge is subject, and its distinctly meaningful role in everyday life. I conclude by considering a worry about self-knowledge that arises on the communication account.

RÉSUMÉ : Il existe une distinction entre connaître quelqu’un de manière détachée, de façon impersonnelle, et connaître quelqu’un de façon plus intime, de façon personnelle. Cette dernière relation, au contraire de la première, semble impliquer la participation particulièrement active de la personne connue. Dans ce texte, je présente une nouvelle analyse de la connaissance intime de quelqu’un qui est fondée sur la communication et explique de manière satisfaisante une telle participation. Cette analyse éclaire aussi la nature propositionnelle et testimoniale de la connaissance intime des personnes, les limites de la transférabilité d’une telle connaissance et son rôle significatif unique dans la vie quotidienne. Je conclus en examinant un problème touchant la connaissance de soi qui surgit dans l’approche communicationnelle.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2010

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