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À la défense du déontologisme doxastique

  • Daniel Laurier (a1)
Abstract

ABSTRACT: I offer a refutation of the standard argument according to which we have no doxastic obligation because we do not have the kind of voluntary control over our beliefs required for having obligations. I then propose an interpretation of the distinction between epistemic and practical reasons for belief which can be generalised to other attitudes such as intention, and seems to imply (i) that mental acts such as judgements and decisions never count as intentional actions, and (ii) that these two sorts of reasons are incommensurable.

RÉSUMÉ : Je réfute l’argument standard selon lequel nous n’avons aucune obligation de croire (ou ne pas croire) quoi que ce soit, parce que nous n’avons pas, sur nos croyances, le genre de contrôle nécessaire pour avoir des obligations. Je propose ensuite une interprétation de la distinction entre raisons épistémiques et raisons pratiques de croire qui est généralisable à d’autres attitudes telles que l’intention et qui semble impliquer (i) que les actes mentaux tels que les jugements et les décisions ne sont jamais des actions intentionnelles et (ii) que ces deux sortes de raisons sont incommensurables.

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Copyright
References
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Bennett, Jonathan 1991 «Why Is Belief Involuntary?», Analysis, vol. 50, p. 87-107.
Dunn, Robert 1991 «Reasons, Attitudes and the Breakdown of Reasons», Philosophia, vol. 21, p. 53-67.
Dunn, Robert 1992 «Akratic Attitudes and Rationality», Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 70, p. 24-39.
Feldman, Richard 1988 «Epistemic Obligations», Tomberlin, J. E., dir., Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 2, Atascadero (CA), Ridgeview, p. 235-256.
Feldman, Richard 2000 «The Ethics of Belief», Philosophy And Phenomenological Research, vol. 60, p. 667-695.
Frankfurt, Harry G. 1969 «Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility», Frankfurt, H. G., The Importance of What We Care About, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 1-10 [1988].
Frankfurt, Harry G 1971 «Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person», Frankfurt, H. G., The Importance of What We Care About, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 11-25 [1988].
Hieronymi, Pamela 2006 «Controlling Attitudes», Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 87, p. 45-74.
Jäger, Christoph 2004 «Epistemic Deontology, Doxastic Voluntarism and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities», Löffler, W. et Weingartner, P., dir., Knowledge and Belief. Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Vienne, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, p. 217-227.
Parfit, Derek 2001 «Rationality and Reasons», Egonsson, D. et al. , dir., Exploring Practical Philosophy. From Actions to Values, Aldershot, Ashgate, p. 17-39.
Piller, Christian 2001 «Normative Practical Reasoning», Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. supp. 75, p. 195-216.
Piller, Christian 2006 «Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences», Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement, vol. 59, p. 155-181.
Steup, Mathias 2008 «Doxastic Freedom», Synthese, vol. 161, p. 375-392.
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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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