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Luck and Manipulation Cases: A Response to Professor Haji

  • NEIL LEVY (a1)

In his paper published in this issue, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that the challenge to compatibilism from luck is not novel. Rather, the challenge is identical to that from manipulation cases, and compatibilists already have responses to that challenge. In response, I distinguish two different luck problems for compatibilism. One challenge is seen in manipulation cases, but the challenge he identifies is different from the challenge from manipulation. The luck problem is therefore novel, and the existing solutions to the challenge from manipulation fail to address it.

Dans un article publié dans ce numéro, Ishtiyaque Haji soutient que la difficulté posée par la chance au compatibilisme n’est pas nouvelle, mais qu’elle est en fait identique au problème inhérent aux cas de manipulation, auquel les compatibilistes ont déjà répondu. Dans cet article, je distingue deux problèmes que la chance pose au compatibilisme. Si l’un des deux est bien celui que l’on trouve dans les cas de manipulation, celui identifié par Haji est cependant différent. La difficulté soulevée par la chance est donc bien originale, et les solutions au problème des cas de manipulation échouent à y répondre.

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Coffman, E.J. 2007 “Thinking about Luck.” Synthese 158: 385398.
Haji, Ishtiyaque 2004 “Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action.” Philosophical Explorations 7: 131148.
Haji, Ishtiyaque 2009 Incompatibilism’s Allure. Peterborough, ON.: Broadview.
Haji, Ishtiyaque 2015 “Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism.” Dialogue, doi:10.1017/S0012217315000682.
Haji, Ishtiyaque, and Cuypers, Stefaan 2007 “Magical Agents, Global Induction, and the Internal/External Debate.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85: 343371.
Hurley, Susan 1993 “Justice Without Constitutive Luck.” In Griffith, A.P. (ed.), Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 179212.
Levy, Neil 2011 Hard Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Levy, Neil 2014 Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McKenna, Michael 2004 “Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents.” Philosophical Topics 32: 169192.
McKenna, Michael 2008 “A hard-line reply to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 42159.
Mele, Alfred 1995 Autonomous Agents. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Pérez de Calleja, Mirja 2014 “Cross-World Luck at the Time of Decision is a Problem for Compatibilists as Well.” Philosophical Explorations 17: 112125.
Pritchard, Duncan 2005 Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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