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On Robust Discursive Equality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 August 2018

THOMAS M. BESCH
THOMAS M. BESCH*
Affiliation:
Wuhan University
*
*<thomas.besch@sydney.edu.au>
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Abstract

This paper explores the idea of robust discursive equality on which respect-based conceptions of justificatory reciprocity often draw. I distinguish between formal and substantive discursive equality and argue that if justificatory reciprocity requires that people be accorded formally equal discursive standing, robust discursive equality should not be construed as requiring standing that is equal substantively, or in terms of its discursive purchase. Still, robust discursive equality is purchase sensitive: it does not obtain when discursive standing is impermissibly unequal in purchase. I then showcase different candidate conceptions of purchase justice, and draw conclusions about the substantive commitments of justificatory reciprocity.

Cet article explore l’idée d’égalité discursive robuste sur laquelle reposent bien souvent les conceptions de la réciprocité justificative basées sur le respect. Je distingue l’égalité discursive formelle et substantive en estimant que si la réciprocité justificative requiert que les interlocuteurs bénéficient d’une posture discursive égale du point de vue formel, une égalité discursive robuste ne devrait pas être comprise comme exigeant des postures discursives substantivement égales, ni être envisagée dans les termes de son poids discursif («discursive purchase»). Toutefois, l’égalité discursive robuste est sensible aux poids des discours: elle est absente lorsque le poids des discours est manifestement inégal. Je montre ensuite différentes conceptions possibles de la justice en termes de poids discursif et je tire des conclusions sur les engagements substantifs de réciprocité justificative.

Keywords

discursive equalitypublic justificationreciprocityinclusiondiscursive standingRainer Forstreciprocity and generality
Type
Original Article/Article original
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 58 , Issue 3 , September 2019 , pp. 465 - 490
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 

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