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    Moore, Dwayne 2013. Counterfactuals, Autonomy and Downward Causation: Reply to Zhong. Philosophia, Vol. 41, Issue. 3, p. 831.


Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying Causes

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  • Published online: 01 September 2012

Qualia epiphenomenalism is the view that qualitative properties of events, such as the raw feel of tastes or painfulness, lack causal efficacy. One common objection to qualia epiphenomenalism is the epistemic argument, which states that this loss of causal efficacy undermines our capacity to know about these epiphenomenal qualitative properties (Sterjnberg, 1999; Watkins, 1989). A number of rejoinders have been offered up to insulate qualia epiphenomenalism from the epistemic argument. In this paper I consider and ultimately reject two such replies, namely, the common underlying cause reply and the appeal to physical-effect epiphenomenalism.

L’épiphénoménalisme des qualia est la thèse voulant que les propriétés qualitatives des événements, comme les sensations de goût ou de douleur, soient dénuées d’efficacité causale. On objecte souvent à cette forme d’épiphénoménalisme l’argument épistémique, selon lequel cette absence d’efficacité causale nous rendrait incapables de connaître ces mêmes propriétés qualitatives épiphénoménales (Sterjnberg, 1999; Watkins, 1989). Plusieurs réponses ont été proposées pour isoler l’épiphénoménalisme des qualia de l’argument épistémique. J’étudie dans cet article, pour finalement les rejeter, deux de ces réponses, soit l’appel à la cause sous-jacente commune (Common Underlying Cause Reply) et l’appel à l’épiphénoménalisme des événements physiques.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
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