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  • Cited by 2
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    1980. The Mind–Body Problem.


    MAYBERRY, THOMAS C. 1978. THE PERCEPTUAL THEORY OF PAIN. Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 1, Issue. 1, p. 31.


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Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory1

  • Norman Malcolm (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300044656
  • Published online: 01 June 2010
Abstract

My main topic will be, roughly speaking, the claim that mental events or conscious experiences or inner experiences are brain processes. I hasten to say, however, that I am not going to talk about “mental events” or “conscious experiences” or “inner experiences.” These expressions are almost exclusively philosophers terms, and I am not sure that I have got the hang of any of them. Philosophers are not in agreement in their use of these terms. One philosopher will say, for example, that a pain in the foot is a mental event, whereas another will say that a pain in the foot certainly is not a mental event.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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