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Searle Rediscovers What Was Not Lost*

  • Tim Kenyon (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300047624
  • Published online: 01 April 2010
Abstract

John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind comprises two related projects. The first is to show that philosophy of mind since Descartes has been not merely false, but obviously false. The materialist tradition—as Searle encapsulates behaviourism, type and token identity theories, functionalism, Artificial Intelligence, and eliminativism—consists of more or less crazy positions, with a crucial shared trait: they “leave out” the mind, the very thing they were to explain. Searle's second concern is to sketch his own theory of mind, a “common-sense” view that is, he claims, obviously true, and thus is a sharp departure from the madness of the various received views of this century.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Daniel C. Dennett 1993Review of The Rediscovery of the Mind.” The Journal of Philosophy, 90, 4 (April): 193205.

Jaegwin Kim 1995Mental Causation in Searle's ‘Biological Naturalism.’Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55, 1 (March): 189–94.

U. T. Place 1988Thirty Years On—Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66, 2: 208–19.

John R. Searle 1995Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle: A Reply.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55, 1 (March): 217–32.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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