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Williamson and the Argument from Luminosity

  • P. X. Monaghan (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300002870
  • Published online: 01 April 2009
Abstract
ABSTRACT

Many of the results of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits depend upon his argument that many, if not all, of our mental states fail to be luminous in the sense that if we are in them, then we are in a position to know that we are in them. The purpose of this article is to show that his argument is unsound. I conclude by distinguishing between partial and total luminosity, and by arguing that even if mental states are not totally luminous, they are at least partially so.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Nelson Goodman 1977 The Structure of Appearance. With an introduction by G. Hellman . 3rd ed.Dordrecht: R. Reidel Publishing.

R. Neta , and G. Rohrbaugh 2004Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85: 396406.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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