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    BALL, STEPHEN W. 1990. Dworkin and His Critics: The Relevance of Ethical Theory in Philosophy of Law. Ratio Juris, Vol. 3, Issue. 3, p. 340.

    Penn, James 1990. Towards an ecologically-based society: a Rawlsian perspective. Ecological Economics, Vol. 2, Issue. 3, p. 225.


Economic Equality: Rawls versus Utilitarianism

  • Stephen W. Ball (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 December 2008

Perhaps the most salient feature of Rawls's theory of justice (Rawls, 1971) which at once attracts supporters and repels critics is its apparent egalitarian conclusion as to how economic goods are to be distributed. Indeed, many of Rawls's sympathizers may find this result intuitively appealing, and regard it as Rawls's enduring contribution to the topic of economic justice, despite technical deficiencies in Rawls's contractarian, decision-theoretic argument for it (see, e.g., Nagel, 1973, p. 234) which occupy the bulk of the critical literature. Rawls himself, having proposed a “coherence” theory of justification in metaethics, must regard the claim that his distributive criterion “is a strongly egalitarian conception” (Rawls, 1971, p. 76) as independently a part of the overarching moral argument. The alleged egalitarian impact of Rawls's theory is crucial again in normative ethics where Rawls is thought to have developed a major counter-theory to utilitarianism (cf. Braybrooke, 1975, p. 304), one of the most popular criticisms of which has been its alleged inadequacy in handling questions of distributive justice. Utilitarians can argue, however, as Brandt recently has, that the diminishing marginal utility of money, along with ignorance of income-welfare curves, would require a utility-maximizing distribution to be substantially egalitarian (Brandt, 1979, pp. 311f., 315f.; cf. Brandt, 1983, p. 102f.). The challenge is therefore for Rawls to show that his theory yields an ethically preferable degree of equality.

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Kenneth J. Arrow 1973. “Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory of Justice.” Journal of Philosophy 70:245–63.

David Braybrooke . 1973. “Utilitarianism with a Difference: Rawls' Position in Ethics.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3:303–31.

Scott Gordon . 1973. “John Rawls' Difference Principle, Utilitarianism, and the Optimum Degree of Inequality.” Journal of Philosophy 70:275–80.

H. L. A. Hart 1973. “Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority.” Chicago Law Review 40:534–55.

Thomas Nagel . 1973. “Rawls on Justice.” Philosophical Review 82:220–34.

John Rawls . 1974b. “A Reply to Alexander and Musgrave.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 88:633–55.

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Economics & Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0266-2671
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