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Fairness as Mutual Advantage? A Comment on Buchanan and Gauthier

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Hans-Peter Weikard
Hans-Peter Weikard
Affiliation:
Universität Göttingen
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Extract

The concept of fairness as mutual advantage has been developed in the tradition of social contract theory. In this framework society is seen as an enterprise that coordinates the activities of its members in order to advance their interests. All acceptable social rules are in the interest of each member of society. Rules are agreed unanimously – no rules can be enforced against the interest of someone. It is assumed that individuals are basically self-interested and rational. Radical libertarianism claims that individuals do not have to accept any a priori constraints on their behavior. “Libertarianism focuses on negative freedom” (Schokkaert, 1992, p. 89).

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , April 1994 , pp. 59 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

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