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    Khalil, Elias L. 2015. The Fellow-Feeling Paradox: Hume, Smith and the Moral Order. Philosophy, Vol. 90, Issue. 04, p. 653.


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    KHALIL, ELIAS L. 2010. ADAM SMITH’S CONCEPT OF SELF-COMMAND AS A SOLUTION TO DYNAMIC INCONSISTENCY AND THE COMMITMENT PROBLEM. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 48, Issue. 1, p. 177.


    Peart, Sandra J. and Levy, David M. 2008. Discussion, construction and evolution: Mill, Buchanan and Hayek on the constitutional order. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 19, Issue. 1, p. 3.


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    Peart, Sandra J. and Levy, David M. 2005. A discipline without sympathy: the happiness of the majority and its demise. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d&apos;<html_ent glyph="@eacute;" ascii="e"/>conomique, Vol. 38, Issue. 3, p. 937.


    Schliesser, Eric 2005. Wonder in the face of scientific revolutions: Adam Smith on Newton's ‘Proof’ of Copernicanism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Vol. 13, Issue. 4, p. 697.


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SYMPATHY AND APPROBATION IN HUME AND SMITH: A SOLUTION TO THE OTHER RATIONAL SPECIES PROBLEM

  • DAVID M. LEVY (a1) and SANDRA J. PEART (a2)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267104000239
  • Published online: 01 October 2004
Abstract

David Hume's sympathetic principle applies to physical equals. In his account, we sympathize with those like us. By contrast, Adam Smith's sympathetic principle induces equality. We consider Hume's “other rational species” problem to see whether Smith's wider sympathetic principle would alter Hume's conclusion that “superior” beings will enslave “inferior” beings. We show that Smith introduces the notion of “generosity,” which functions as if it were Hume's justice even when there is no possibility of contract.

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An earlier version was presented at the 18th-Century Scottish Studies Society, Arlington meeting in June 2001. We benefited from conversations with and comments from Gordon Schochet, Roger Emerson and Silvia Sebastiana. A letter from Leon Montes helped sharpen the argument. The readers for the journal contributed to the output. We remain responsible for the errors and omissions.
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Economics & Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0266-2671
  • EISSN: 1474-0028
  • URL: /core/journals/economics-and-philosophy
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