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Chang, Ruth 2016. Parity, Imprecise Comparability and the Repugnant Conclusion. Theoria, Vol. 82, Issue. 2, p. 182.
Munda, Giuseppe 2016. Beyond welfare economics: some methodological issues. Journal of Economic Methodology, Vol. 23, Issue. 2, p. 185.
ROSSI, MAURO 2016. Value and Preference Relations: Are They Symmetric?. Utilitas, Vol. 28, Issue. 03, p. 239.
Gert, Joshua 2015. Parity, Preference and Puzzlement. Theoria, Vol. 81, Issue. 3, p. 249.
Munda, Giuseppe 2015. BEYOND GDP: AN OVERVIEW OF MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN REDEFINING ‘WEALTH’. Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 29, Issue. 3, p. 403.
Rabinowicz, Wlodek 2015. From values to probabilities. Synthese,
Munda, Giuseppe 2014. On the Use of Shadow Prices for Sustainable Well-Being Measurement. Social Indicators Research, Vol. 118, Issue. 2, p. 911.
Rossi, Mauro 2014. Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences. Les ateliers de l'éthique, Vol. 9, Issue. 2, p. 82.
Chang, Ruth 2012. ARE HARD CHOICES CASES OF INCOMPARABILITY?. Philosophical Issues, Vol. 22, Issue. 1, p. 106.
In Rabinowicz (2008), I considered how value relations can best be analysed in terms of fitting pro-attitudes. In the formal model of that paper, fitting pro-attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of ‘better’, ‘worse’, ‘equally as good as’ and ‘incomparable in value’. Unfortunately, the approach is vulnerable to a number of objections. I believe these objections can be avoided if one re-interprets the underlying notion of preference: instead of treating preference as a ‘dyadic’ attitude directed towards a pair of items, we can think of it as a difference of degree between ‘monadic’ attitudes of favouring. Each such monadic attitude has just one item as its object. Given this re-interpretation, permissible preferences can be modelled by the class of permissible assignments of degrees of favouring to items in the domain. From this construction, we can then recover the old modelling in terms of the class of permissible preference orderings, but the previous objections to that model no longer apply.
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