In this article I interpret 150 years of financial history with a focus on shifts in the role of finance in society. I argue that over time the role of finance has shifted twice from that of servant to that of master of society, and that this process has been driven by sense making through narratives that legitimized and shaped these changes. When finance became a master rent seeking, cultural capture and out-of-control financial innovation resulted in financial and social instability. Finance as a master was the characteristic of finance capitalism from around 1900–1931 and of financialization from around 1980 to today. Finance capitalism and financialization were enabled by a dominant narrative that legitimized the power of finance. The shifts in the role of finance happened when crises undermined the meaning of the existing narrative and created for a new narrative able to make sense of the crisis and point society in a new direction. This sense-making process stabilized when a new narrative was established that could explain the crisis and legitimize and shape a new role for finance. The article is based on my presidential address presented at the Business History Conference’s annual meeting in March 2014 in Frankfurt.

Where Imperialism Could Not Reach examines the impact of the Japanese model of industrialization on China through a history of policy recommendations and economic ideas in practice. In the aftermath of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), Chinese regional policymakers learned a Japanese-style industrial policy that focused on the use of exhibitions and schools to disseminate information and stimulate rural innovation. In focusing on the treaty ports and the impact of European and American capitalism that has a larger and more quantifiable source base, many scholars have ignored the vital intra-Asian dimensions of China’s economic development, underpinned by shared position of China and Japan on the global semiperiphery and the pursuit of labor-intensive industrialization focusing on improvements to labor quality. The dissertation also aims to demonstrate the primary importance of information and incentives for innovation—rather than overcoming capital constraints—in Chinese strategies for economic growth.

In the early modern Atlantic world, trade brought communities and commodities closer together and, as a result, many merchants became linked in expansive networks of exchange. The unstable nature of long-distance trade meant that these networks were continually being transformed. The Liverpool–New York trade network, in particular, underwent many changes between 1763 and 1833. The article aims to demonstrate how the use of network visualizations over three distinct phases (1760–1790, 1790–1815, and 1815–1833) can elucidate these changes and provide a different approach for studying the development of this trading community. These visualizations will serve to illustrate the extent to which this network was dynamic and further our understanding of how merchant networks sustained longevity and coped with risks in the ever-changing Atlantic world.

Much of international business literature has dealt with the costs of engaging in business abroad. Recently, several authors have called into question the basic assumptions of the “liability of foreignness” argument. They plead for a more nuanced look at nationality beyond the dichotomy of foreign vis-à-vis local firms and raise doubts about the assumption that more distance necessarily translates into higher costs. This article adds to this criticism with a historical analysis of German multinational enterprises in preindependence India. The case proves (1) the relevance of specific nationalities, (2) the importance of conflicting host and home country attitudes for understanding multinationals’ strategy, and (3) the possibility of spillover effects across national borders. Expanding on existing theory, the article makes a point in showing how malleable and contextual associations with nationality are, thus making a thorough historical analysis of commercial, political, and cultural links between host and home country indispensable.

This article is a contribution to the prehistory of modern branding, presenting a case study of the textile trade in colonial Southeast Asia. The visual appearance of brands as well as their social meaning were altered in the cultural encounter of colonial trade. Through these encounters, trademarks were modernized: the reputation of a producer became less important than the distinctiveness of the product.

This article contributes to a line of research in Business History that aims to determine the factors of family business longevity in the long term with the study of individual cases. The literature has identified family cohesion as one of the essential factors for survival. Cohesion may be reinforced or broken at the time of the intergenerational transfer. This study finds that a critical response on the part of the business family to the difficulties associated with intergenerational transfer of control, including modifications to the original plan, is usually based on trust between generations. Within the business family cohesion facilitates intergenerational transfers and, consequently, allows the family to evolve and transform itself into a business dynasty.

Whereas the globalization of medicine since the middle of the 19th century has primarily been approached as the sociopolitical and cultural outcome of imperialism, this article argues that Western big business also played a major role through the worldwide export of standardized medical technologies. It focuses on the expansion of Siemens on the X-ray equipment market in non-Western countries during the first half of the twentieth century. This German multinational enterprise experienced slight growth from the mid-1920s onwards but relied mainly on two markets (Argentina and Brazil). It specialized in providing large-scale equipment to a few urban hospitals and engaged during the 1930s in large-scale hospital development together with local authorities and international organizations in various countries (China, Peru, and Central Africa). However, Siemens had great difficulty in expanding its business to include private doctors and inland outlets, where it faced intense competition from other Western X-ray producers. This paper emphasizes that this shortcoming stemmed from a direct application of the European strategy (high-quality, expensive equipment for hospitals) to non-Western markets, where health systems differed.

This article develops a historical perspective on the coordinated market economy of the Netherlands and explains why it opted for compartmentalized liberalization. Two related questions are addressed, studying the Netherlands as a case study of a Coordinated Market Economy (CME): to what extent can economic change be accommodated within one “type of capitalism”? And why do specific institutions change while others remain in place? Applying the criteria of “Varieties of Capitalism” I focus on the way the Dutch business system applied nonmarket coordination during the twentieth century. Drawing information from various subfields (business history, labor relations and welfare state studies), I review processes of change and postulate that coordination resulted in the adoption of market-oriented reform in clearly delineated areas. “Varieties of Capitalism” theory addresses the historical roots of institutional arrangements, but historical developments have been underexposed in the comparative capitalism-literature.

Disasters often prompt debates regarding public policy and lead to changes in safety regulations. With the deaths of 47 passengers and crew, the 1993 Sunset Limited tragedy focused public and governmental attention upon safety practices aboard uninspected towing vessels operated on US inland waterways. The event shaped the policy debate as the federal government imposed new safety regulations upon the towing industry and the dominant industry trade organization, the American Waterways Operators, adopted an industry-driven safety program. Subsequent tragedies revealed the inadequacies of the AWO’s Responsible Carrier Program and pushed industry stakeholders toward the creation of a formal US Coast Guard inspection regime for all uninspected towing vessels. Set within the context of steamboat safety regulations dating from 1838 and drawn from diverse primary sources, this article traces the evolution of safety coregulation aboard America’s uninspected towing vessels, explores the Coast Guard’s reluctance to establish a formal inspection regime for uninspected towing vessels, and highlights why self regulation without a form of strong government or third-party involvement is often unsuccessful.