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Trade sanctions and green trade liberalization*


This paper studies the impact of a World Trade Organization withdrawal of trade concessions against countries that fail to respect globally recognized environmental standards. We show that a punishing tariff can be effective when environmental and trade policies are endogenous. When required standards are not too stringent with respect to the marginal damage of pollution, compliance along with free trade as a reward is the unique equilibrium outcome. A positive optimal tariff in the case of non-compliance prevents complete relocation to pollution havens, but only works as a successful credible threat and does not emerge in equilibrium.

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J. M. Grether and J. de Melo (2004), ‘Globalization and dirty industries: do pollution havens matter?’, in R. Baldwin and A. Winters (eds), Challenges to Globalization: Analyzing the Economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 167208.

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Environment and Development Economics
  • ISSN: 1355-770X
  • EISSN: 1469-4395
  • URL: /core/journals/environment-and-development-economics
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