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  • Fabrizio Cariani


I target Pettigrew's application of the accuracy framework to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that Pettigrew's preferred version of the argument might in one sense be circular and, moreover, that Pettigrew's premises have content that goes beyond that of standard chance-credence principles.


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  • Fabrizio Cariani


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