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CHANCE, CREDENCE AND CIRCLES

Abstract
ABSTRACT

I target Pettigrew's application of the accuracy framework to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that Pettigrew's preferred version of the argument might in one sense be circular and, moreover, that Pettigrew's premises have content that goes beyond that of standard chance-credence principles.

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COPYRIGHT: © Cambridge University Press 2017 
Corresponding author
f-cariani@northwestern.edu
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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

M. Caie 2015. ‘Credence in the Image of Chance.’ Philosophy of Science, 82: 626–48.
A. I. Goldman 2002. Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
H. Leitgeb and R. Pettigrew 2010. ‘An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.’ Philosophy of Science, 77: 201–35.
J. Joyce 1998. ‘A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.’ Philosophy of Science, 65: 575–603.
J. Joyce 2009. ‘Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.’ In F. Huber and C. Schmidt-Petri (eds), Degrees of Belief, pp. 263–97. Berlin: Springer.
C. Meacham 2010. ‘Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle.’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61: 407–31.
R. Pettigrew 2012. ‘Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.’ Philosophical Review, 121: 241–75.
R. Pettigrew 2013. ‘A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.’ Episteme, 10: 19–35.
L. Rips 2002. ‘Circular Reasoning.’ Cognitive Science, 26: 767–95.
W. Sinnott-Armstrong 1999. ‘Begging the Question.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 174–91.
B. van Fraassen 1984. ‘Belief and the Will.’ Journal of Philosophy, 81: 235–56.
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Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
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