This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.
William P. Alston (1985). Concepts of epistemic justification. Monist 68:57–89.
Jody Azzouni (2003). The strengthened liar, the expressive strength of natural languages, and regimentation. Philosophical Forum 34:329–50.
Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2004). Voting procedures for complex collective decisions: An epistemic perspective Ratio Juris 17:241–58.
John Broome (2004). Weighing Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bryson Brown (1990). How to be realistic about inconsistency in science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21:281–94.
Bryson Brown (1999). Adjunction and aggregation. Nous 33:273–83.
David M. Estlund (1994). Opinion leaders, independence, and Condorcet's jury theorem. Theory and Decision 36:131–62.
Don Fallis (1997). The epistemic status of probabilistic proof. Journal of Philosophy 94:165–86.
Don Fallis (2002). Goldman on probabilistic inference. Philosophical Studies 109:223–40.
Don Fallis (2004). Epistemic value theory and information ethics. Minds and Machines 14:101–17.
Hartry Field (1982). Realism and relativism. Journal of Philosophy 79:553–67.
Peter Godfrey-Smith (1991). Signal, decision, action. Journal of Philosophy 88:709–22.
Alvin Goldman (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. New York: Oxford University Press.
R. Jeffrey (1956). Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses. Philosophy of Science 23:237–46.
R. Jeffrey (1987). Alias Smith and Jones: The testimony of the senses. Erkenntnis 26:391–99.
Mark Kaplan (2002). Decision theory and epistemology in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, ed. Paul K. Moser . Oxford: Oxford University Press. (pp. 434–62).
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:612–40.
Philip Kitcher (1992). The naturalists return. Philosophical Review 101:53–114.
Philip Kitcher (2001). Knowledge and tradition. Philosophical Topics 29:251–70.
Peter Klein (1985). The virtues of inconsistency. Monist 68:105–35.
Kevin Knight (2002). Measuring inconsistency. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31:77–98.
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager (1993). The one and the many: Adjudication in collegial courts California Law Review 81:1–59.
Saul A. Kripke (1979). A puzzle about belief in Meaning and Use, ed. Avishai Margalit . Dordrecht: D. Reidel (pp. 239–83).
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). Why should inquiring minds want to know?: Meno problems and epistemological axiology. Monist 81:426–51.
Henry E. Kyburg (1970). Conjunctivitis in Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, ed. Marshall Swain . Dordrect: D. Reidel (pp. 55–82).
Keith Lehrer (1975). Reason and consistency in Analysis and Metaphysics, ed. Keith Lehrer . Dordrecht: Reidel (pp. 57–74).
Isaac Levi (1962). On the seriousness of mistakes. Philosophy of Science 29:47–65.
Isaac Levi (2004). List and Pettit. Synthese 140:237–42.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2005). On the many as one: A reply to Kornhauser and Sager. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33: 377–90.
D. C. Makinson (1965). The paradox of the preface. Analysis 25:205–7.
R. W. K. Paterson (1979). Towards an axiology of knowledge. Journal of Philosophy of Education 13:91–100.
Philip Pettit (2001). Deliberative democracy and the discursive dilemma. Philosophical Issues 11:268–99.
John L. Pollock (1994). Justification and defeat. Artificial Intelligence 67:377–407.
Graham Priest (1998). What is so bad about contradictions? Journal of Philosophy 95:410–426.
Linda Zagzebski (2003). The search for the source of epistemic good. Metaphilosophy 34:12–28.