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In Defense of Epistemic Relativism

Abstract
ABSTRACT

In Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against various forms of epistemic relativism. In this paper, I criticize Boghossian’s arguments against a particular variety of relativism. I then argue in favor of a thesis that is very similar to this variety of relativism.

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Paul. Boghossian 2006. Fear of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Richard. Feldman 1988. “Having Evidence.” Pp. 83104 in D. F. Austin , ed. Philosophical Analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
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