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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

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The Epistemic Features of Group Belief

Abstract
ABSTRACT

Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifically, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features of belief. However, I argue that on Margaret Gilbert's influential “plural subject” account of group belief, group views are unlikely to be epistemically rational.

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Pascal. Engel 1998. “Believing, Accepting, Holding True.” Philosophical Explorations 1: 140151.

Don. Fallis 2005. “Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation.” Episteme 2(1): 3955.

Heimat. Giersson 2004. “Contra Collective Epistemic Agency.” Southwest Philosophy Review 20: 163166.

Margaret. Gilbert 2004. “Collective Epistemology.” Episteme 1(2): 95107.

Alvin. Goldman 1999. Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Raul. Hakli 2006. “Group beliefs and the distinction between belief and acceptance.” Cognitive Systems Research 7(2–3): 286297

Jason. Kawall 2000. “Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtues.” Ratio 15(3): 257275.

Kay. Mathiesen . 2005. “Collective Consciousness.” In Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Amie Thomasson and David Woodruff Smith , eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

R. L. Schanck 1932. “A Study of a Community and Its Groups and Institutions Conceived As Behaviors of Individuals.” Psychological Monographs 43.

Matthias Steup , ed. 2001. Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press.

Raimo. Tuomela 1992. “Group Beliefs.” Synthese 91: 285318.

Raimo. Tuomela 2004. “Group Knowledge Analyzed.” Episteme 1(2): 109127.

K. Brad. Wray 2001. “Collective Belief and Acceptance.” Synthese 129: 319333.

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Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
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