Rawls John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); also his
Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
Nagel Thomas, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs
33, no. 2 (2005).
Dworkin Ronald, “What Is Equality?” Philosophy and Public Affairs
10 (1981), no. 3 (pp. 185–246) and no. 4 (pp. 283–345); and his
Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).
Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” p. 115.
Hobbes Thomas, Leviathan (1651), ed. Tuck Richard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Also,
Locke John, Two Treatises of Government (1689), ed. Laslett Peter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and
Rousseau Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract (1762), ed. Cranston Maurice (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968).
While discussing how justice can be effectively pursued when there is an “antecedent covenant”—a much broader notion than a devised social contract—Hobbes went on to point out that “if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then there neither would be nor need to be any Civill Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection” (Leviathan, p. 118).
Tuck Richard, Hobbes (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
A number of entries in the
Encyclopedia of Global Justice, edited by Chatterjee Deen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), have addressed particular problems of ethics and economics related to global justice.
Rawls John, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 119
I have tried to say a bit more on this issue in the 2015 Annual Lecture to the Royal Institute of Philosophy: see “Reason and Justice: The Optimal and the Maximal,” Philosophy
92, no. 1 (2016).
Sen Amartya, The Idea of Justice (London: Allen Lane, and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009).
Chatterjee Deen, “Reciprocity, Closed-Impartiality, and National Borders: Framing (and Extending) the Debate on Global Justice,” Social Philosophy Today
27 (2011), pp. 199–215
The critically important role of allowing incomplete agreements is discussed in my essay, “Reason and Justice: The Optimal and the Maximal” (2016).
Hart Herbert, “Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority,” University of Chicago Law Review
40, no. 3 (1973). See also Rawls's discussion on this in Political Liberalism (1993), Lecture VIII.
Sen Amartya, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970
, and Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979; expanded edition, London: Penguin, and Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2017).
The expanded edition of Collective Choice and Social Welfare (2017) discusses a number of serious problems of injustice in the contemporary world.
Hume David, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1771, republished, La Salle: Open Court, 1966), p. 25
* This essay is based on a talk given at the University of Utah on April 22, 2016, at an event sponsored by the Daniels Fund Ethics Initiative at the Eccles School of Business. I have greatly benefited from discussions with Akeel Bilgrami, Deen Chatterjee, Erin Kelly, Lionel McPherson, Thomas Nagel, Hilary Putnam, and John Rawls.