1 Walzer, Michael, “The Case Against Our Attack on Libya,” New Republic, March 20, 2011; www.tnr.com/article/world/85509/the-case-against-our-attack-libya; and Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), p. 107.
2 See, e.g., Caney, Simon, Justice Beyond Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 236–37, 247; and the symposium “Walzer and the Moral Standing of States,” Ethics & International Affairs 23, no. 4 (Winter 2009).
3 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), p. XII; and Pattison, James, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 20–24.
6 Note here that the considerations of proportionality bear on just cause according to my practically oriented version of just cause. I consider this point further in Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, pp. 20–24.
7 The issue of intent is crucial since in the philosophy of action an agent's intentions are generally held to play a large part in classifying actions (e.g., in determining whether an act is regime change or humanitarian intervention).
8 I defend the moral importance of several of these factors in detail in Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. It may do less well on the internal support requirement, since it is unclear whether the domestic publics of the NATO states supported the action. Notably, in the United States the action did not receive Congressional approval.
9 See, especially, McMahan, Jeff, Killing in War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009).
10 I defend this view in James Pattison, The Morality of Private War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Also see McMahan, Jeff, “The Ethics of Killing in War,” Ethics 114, no. 4 (2004), pp. 693–733, at pp. 713–14; Toner, Christopher, “The Logical Structure of Just War Theory,” Journal of Ethics 14, no. 2 (2010), pp. 81–102; and especially Lango, John, “Generalizing and Temporalizing Just War Principles: Illustrated by the Principle of Just Cause,” in Brough, Michael, Lango, John, and van der Linden, Harry, eds., Rethinking the Just War Tradition (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), pp. 75–95.
11 See, e.g., Doyle, Michael W., “A Few Words on Mill, Walzer, and Nonintervention,” Ethics & International Affairs 23, no. 4 (Winter 2009), pp. 349–69.
12 As Simon Chesterman notes in his contribution to this roundtable, perhaps most questionable is whether the coalition has a suitable strategy for a long-term resolution to the conflict that does not involve regime change. The establishment of such a strategy—which could, for instance, be to achieve a peace settlement and perhaps the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops—may be central to the future success of the action.
13 See, e.g., Hsieh, Nien-Hê, Strudler, Alan, and Wasserman, David, “The Numbers Problem,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 34, no. 3 (2006), pp. 352–72.
14 For simplicity's sake, I focus on the importance of saving the most lives. It may also be that when faced with several potentially permissible humanitarian interventions, interveners should focus on the case in which they are likely to do best according to the other morally relevant factors, such as their likely fidelity to the principles of jus in bello.