Russell Frederick, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and
Wilson Heather, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), ch. 1.
For a detailed list of references, see my “Civil War and Revolution,” in Helen Frowe and Seth Lazar, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). In addition, see
Fabre Cécile, “Cosmopolitanism, Just War Theory and Legitimate Authority,” International Affairs
84, no. 5 (2008), pp. 963–76; Yitzhak Benbaji, “Legitimate Authority in War,” in Frowe and Lazar, Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War;
Reitberger Magnus, “License to Kill: Is Legitimate Authority a Requirement for Just War?” International Theory
5, no. 1 (2013), pp. 64–93
Heinze Eric A. and Steele Brent J., eds., Ethics, Authority, and War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009);
Lang Anthony F. Jr., O'Driscoll Cian, and Williams John, eds., Just War: Authority, Tradition, and Practice (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013);
Blair Robert and Kalmanovitz Pablo, “On the Rights of Warlords: Legitimate Authority and Basic Protection in War-Torn Societies,” American Political Science Review
110, no. 3 (2016), pp. 428–40;
Stilz Anna, “Authority, Self-Determination, and Community in Cosmopolitan War,” Law and Philosophy
33, no. 3 (2014) pp. 309–35;
Steinhoff Uwe, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 1; and
Kutz Christopher, On War and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), ch. 3.
I defend these claims in much more detail in
Parry Jonathan, “Just War Theory, Legitimate Authority, and Irregular Belligerency,” Philosophia
43, no. 1 (2015), pp. 175–96. In his contribution to this special section, Pål Wrange argues that, as a matter of international law, the notion of authority in war may in fact be much more diverse than I have suggested.
For similar interpretations, see
Fabre Cécile, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 160;
Finlay Christopher “Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence,” Journal of Political Philosophy
18, no. 3 (2010), pp. 287–312
; and Reitberger, “License to Kill.” See also
Coates A. J., The Ethics of War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), ch. 5.
For a recent endorsement, see
Brunstetter Daniel, “
Jus ad Vim: A Rejoinder to Helen Frowe,” Ethics & International Affairs
30, no. 1 (2016), pp. 131–36.
Reichberg Gregory M., “The Moral Equality of Combatants – A Doctrine in Classical Just War Theory? A Response to Graham Parsons,” Journal of Military Ethics
12, no. 2 (2013), pp. 181–94.
As George Fletcher points out, “Until the Statute of Henry VIII, passed in 1532 . . . there was no theory of self-defense that rendered a killing fully lawful, justifiable and therefore free of the taint that affected excusable homicide.”
Fletcher George, “Defensive Force as an Act of Rescue,” Social Philosophy and Policy
7, no. 2 (1990), p. 171.
For discussion, see, Kutz, On War and Democracy, ch. 3.
McMahan Jeff, Killing in War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Fabre, Cosmopolitan War; and
Frowe Helen, Defensive Killing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also
Draper Kai, War and Individual Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
Here I draw on
Lazar Seth, “National Defence, Self-Defence, and the Problem of Political Aggression,” in Fabre Cécile and Lazar Seth, eds., The Morality of Defensive War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 11–39
Glover Jonathan, Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1977), pp. 251–52. For an analogue of the continuity thesis applied to the use of force by state officials outside the context of war, see
Gardner John, “Criminals in Uniform,” in Duff Anthony, Farmer Lindsay, Marshall Sandra, Renzo Massimo, and Tadros Victor, eds., The Constitution of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 97–118
Lazar, “National Defence, Self-Defence, and the Problem of Political Aggression,” p. 12.
McMahan Jeff, “War as Self-Defense,” Ethics & International Affairs
18, no. 1 (2004), pp. 75–80
Nickel James W., “Griffin on Human Rights to Liberty,” in Crisp Roger, ed., Griffin on Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 200.
Ferzan Kimberly, “Self-Defense and the State,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law
5, no. 2 (2008), pp. 449–504
McMahan Jeff, “Just War,” in Goodin Robert E., Pettit Philip, and Pogge Thomas, eds., A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), p. 671. For further reductivist rejections of the restrictive authority criterion, see Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, chs. 3–4;
McMahan Jeff, “Just Cause for War,” Ethics & International Affairs
19, no. 3 (2005), pp. 1–21
, especially p. 4; and Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism, ch. 1.
Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, pp. 144–45. See also Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism, p. 20;
Steinhoff Uwe, “What is War?—And Can a Lone Individual Wage One?” International Journal of Applied Philosophy
23, no. 1 (2009), pp. 133–50; and
Pattison James, “When Is It Right to Fight? Just War Theory and the Individual-Centric Approach,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
16, no. 1 (2013), pp. 34–54
, especially p. 53.
See McMahan, Killing in War.
McMahan Jeff, “War,” in Estlund David, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 298–315
, at p. 310 (my emphasis).
In a talk given at Stockholm University in May 2014, McMahan explicitly labeled this view the “No Extensions Principle.”
Finlay, “Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence”;
Finlay Christopher, Terrorism and the Right to Resist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015);
Schwenkenbecher Anne, “Rethinking Legitimate Authority,” in Allhoff Fritz, Evans Nicholas G., and Henschke Adam, eds., Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 161–70;
Lazar Seth, “Authorisation and the Morality of War,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
94, no. 2 (2016), pp. 211–26. See also
McPherson Lionel K., “Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?” Ethics
117, no. 3 (2007), pp. 524–46.
For more detailed discussion, see
Fabre Cécile, “Permissible Rescue Killings,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
109 (2009), pp. 149–64; Finlay, “Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence.”
Goodin Robert E., “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and its Alternatives,” Philosophy & Public Affairs
35, no. 1 (2007), pp. 40–68
Tesón Fernando, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” in Holzgrefe J. L. and Keohane Robert O., eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 93–130
Pattison James, “Representativeness and Humanitarian Intervention,” Journal of Social Philosophy
38, no. 4 (2007), pp. 569–87.
For further discussion, see
Buchanan Allen, “The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention,” Journal of Political Philosophy
7, no. 1 (1999), pp. 71–87
A similar point might also apply to bystanders: If bystanders have a duty to shoulder a certain level of risk, their objections to the use of force may be discounted.
Brighouse Harry and Fleurbaey Marc, “Democracy and Proportionality,” Journal of Political Philosophy
18, no. 32 (2010), pp. 137–55.
For further discussion, see Benbaji, “Legitimate Authority in War.”
Based on a case in
Altman Andrew and Wellman Christopher Heath, “From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination: Human Rights and Political Violence,” Ethics
118, no. 2 (2008), pp. 228–57, especially p. 244.
I explore this particular idea at length in Jonathan Parry, “Consent and the Justification of Defensive Harm” (unpublished manuscript).
Shapiro Scott, “Authority,” in Coleman Jules and Shapiro Scott, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 382–439
The following proposal draws on arguments I defend in much greater detail in Jonathan Parry, “Authority and Harm,” in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall, eds., Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Vol. 3 (forthcoming). For different arguments for a broadly similar conclusion, see
Estlund David, “On Following Orders in an Unjust War,” Journal of Political Philosophy
15, no. 2 (2007), pp. 213–34;
Ryan Cheyney, “Democratic Duty and the Moral Dilemmas of Soldiers,” Ethics
122, no. 1 (2011), pp. 10–42
; and Massimo Renzo, “Duties of Citizenship and Just War” (unpublished manuscript).
Smith Matthew Noah, “Political Obligation and the Self,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
86, no. 2 (2013), p. 349 (my emphasis).
Raz Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (New York: Clarendon Press, 1986), chs. 1–4;
Raz Joseph, Between Authority and Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), ch. 5.
For a different invocation of a Razian conception of authority in the context of war, see Benbaji, “Legitimate Authority in War.”
Raz, Morality of Freedom, p. 53.
Raz, Morality of Freedom, pp. 67–69. The preemptive character of commands can also be defended by an argument from double counting. Ibid., pp. 58–59.
Raz, Morality of Freedom, p. 71.
See, for example,
Green Leslie, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988);
Simmons A. John, “Political Obligation and Authority,” in Simon Robert L., ed., The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), pp. 17–37; and
Raz Joseph, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), ch. 12.