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The consistency principle: Crisis perceptions, partisanship and public support for democratic norms in comparative perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2026

Amanda Driscoll Open the ORCID record for Amanda Driscoll [Opens in a new window] ,
Jay Krehbiel Open the ORCID record for Jay Krehbiel [Opens in a new window] ,
Michael J. Nelson Open the ORCID record for Michael J. Nelson [Opens in a new window]  and
Sangyeon Kim
Amanda Driscoll*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Florida State University, USA
Jay Krehbiel
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, USA
Michael J. Nelson
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, USA
Sangyeon Kim
Affiliation:
Observatory on Social Media and the Luddy School of Informatics, Computing, and Engineering, Indiana University, USA
*
Address for Correspondence: Amanda Driscoll, Department of Political Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA. Email: adriscoll@fsu.edu
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Abstract

A growing body of research theorizes that partisanship can undermine democracy as citizens prioritize their political interests over abstract norms and values. We argue that crises might counteract intense partisanship by giving citizens clarity on the threats posed by rule of law violations. Examining the differential application of a law – a breach of democratic norms – we draw on an experiment embedded in representative surveys of Germany, the United States, Hungary and Poland to examine citizens’ sense of appropriate punishment for elites’ violation of a municipal mask‐wearing ordinance. We find evidence of partisan bias in citizens’ willingness to support punishment in all four countries. But, in the two consolidated democracies, we find that concern about the Covid‐19 crisis diminishes partisan biases in punishment preferences: citizens who are most concerned about the crisis also model the most consistency in their willingness to hold copartisans into account.

Keywords

consistency principlerule of lawcompliancecrisisdemocratic norms

Information

Type
Research Note
Information
European Journal of Political Research , Volume 64 , Issue 1 , February 2025 , pp. 406 - 416
Copyright
Copyright © 2024 European Consortium for Political Research.

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