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Economic voting: The effect of political context, volatility and turnout on voters’ assignment of responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Åsa Bengtsson
Åsa Bengtsson*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Åbo Akademi University, Finland
*
Address for correspondence: Åsa Bengtsson, Department of Political Science, Åbo Akademi University, Biskopsgatan 15, FIN‐20500 Åbo, Finland Tel.: +358 2 215 3239; Fax: +358 2 215 4585; E‐mail: asa.bengtsson@abo.fi
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Abstract

This study analyses macroeconomic conditions and the electoral fortune of incumbents in 21 parliamentary Western countries between 1950 and 1997 in 266 national elections. Voters’ assignment of responsibility for the state of the national economy is assumed to vary according to the context of the election. Building on previous research, the importance of the political context – clarity of responsibility and availability of alternatives – is analysed. The study also breaks new ground by introducing two new contexts of importance: volatility, seen from a systemic perspective, and the trend in turnout. The contextual hypothesis is confirmed. The universal economic effect as such is very weak indeed. However, given a favourable political and institutional environment (clear responsibility structure and availability of alternatives), an economic effect appears. Tests including the new contexts created on the basis of behavioural patterns in the electorate (system volatility and turnout trend) identify elections where the economic effects are even stronger.

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Type
Original Articles
Information
European Journal of Political Research , Volume 43 , Issue 5 , August 2004 , pp. 749 - 767
Copyright
Copyright © European Consortium for Political Research 2004

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