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The Problem of Adequacy Reflections on Alfred Schutz's Contribution to the Methodology of the Social Sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

Anton C. Zijderveld
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Extract

The theories of the Austrian-American philosopher and social scientist Alfred Schutz have been summarized and introduced sufficiently by various of his students. The purpose of the present paper is not to provide the reader with yet another comprehensive summary of his phenomenology and social theories but will try to formulate what Schutz has contributed to one of the most crucial issues in the methodology of the social sciences, namely the problem of an adequate social theory. Without underestimating the many fruitful insights of his phenomenological philosophy and the contributions he made to social theory in general, it was in the field of methodology that, according to this author's opinion, Schutz contributed most to the social sciences.

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Notes Critiques
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European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 13 , Issue 1 , May 1972 , pp. 176 - 190
Copyright
Copyright © Archives Européenes de Sociology 1972

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References

* For Schutz's, Alfred writings see his Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt [1932] (Vienna, Springer Verlag, 1960)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This dissertation of his has been translated by Walsch, G. and Lehnert, F. and published under the title The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1967)Google Scholar. His Collected Papers were published by Nijhoff, Martinus in The Hague: vol. I,The Problem of Social Reality (1962)Google Scholar; vol. II, Studies in Social Theory (1964)Google Scholar; vol. III, Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy (1966)Google Scholar. His most important methodological papers can be found in vol. I. An unfinished manuscript of a larger study on the problem of relevance was edited and posthumously published by Zaner, Richard M., Reflections on the Problem of Relevance (New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1970)Google Scholar. An excellent introduction to Schutz's thinking provides Aron Gurwitsch in his introduction to vol. III of the Collected Papers. See also M. Natanson's introduction to vol. I and Zaner's introduction to Schutz's Reflections on the Problem of Relevance. An interesting study of Schutz's theory of multiple realities presents Berger's, P. L. The problem of Multiple Realities: Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil, in Natanson, M. (ed.), Phenomenology and Social Reality. Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 213–233CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

(1) See for James', Williamtheory of reality: Schutz, On Multiple Realities, Collected Papers, I, pp. 207–259Google Scholar.

(2) X. I. Thomas, in Janowitz, M. (ed.), On Social Organization and Social Personality (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1966)Google Scholar: “[…] the environment by which [i.e. man in everyday life] is influenced and to which he adapts himself, is his world, not the objective world of science—is nature and society as he sees them, not as the scientist sees them” (p. 23).

(3) Blumer, Herbert, Symbolic Interity actionism (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 2Google Scholar.

(4) Blumer, H., op. cit. p. 3Google Scholar.

(5) Ibid.

(6) The phenomenological theory of meaning is much in danger of becoming too psychological (cf. Schutz's dissertation) —a danger “symbolic interactionism” seems to be able to avoid successfully because of its emphasis on interaction. We can, of course, not enter into this important point in further detail.

(7) This is not the place to discuss the fascinating convergence between some fundamental notions in James' pragmatism, Bergson's vitalism and Husserl's phenomenology. Cf. Schutz, , James', WilliamConcept of the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically Interpreted, Collected Papers, III, pp. 1–14Google Scholar.

(8) The following discussion of Weber's, methodology is based on his essays in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre3, (Tübingen, Mohr, 1968)Google Scholar.

(9) It is interesting to note that a similarly probabilistic concept of reality was developed by the Austrian novelist-philosopher Musil, Robert in his Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften (Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1952)Google Scholar. Musil distinguishes Wirklichkeitssinn and Moeglichkeitssinn. He defines the latter as “die Faehigkeit, alles was ebensogut sein koennte, zu denken und das, was ist, nicht wichtiger zu nehmen als das, was nicht ist” (p. 16). He calls this probabilism: Essayis mus (p. 250 sq.) See P. L. Berger, op. cit.

(10) It has been correctly noted that Weber applies here an ontological argument as to the nature of historical reality. He thereby transcends his otherwise logical-positivistic position.

(11) Pareto's concept “non-logical conduct” is residual in that it receives its meaning from its deviation from logical conduct. Logical conduct, in its turn, is defined as an artificial, scientific type indicating behavior which strictly follows a causal course from motives through means to ends. Also Pareto's distinction of residues and derivations must be understood in terms of this kind of residual logic: it is relatively easy to define derivations (they are “rationalizations afterwards” giving conduct the appearance of being rational), Residues then are those components in man which remain after all derivations have been scientifically formulated and explained. See Pareto, V., The Mind and Society. A treatise on general sociology, transl. by Bon-Giorno, A. and Livingston, A. (New York, Dover Publications, 1963)Google Scholar. See for selections from these four volumes Lopreato, J., Vilfredo Pareto (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1967)Google Scholar.

(12) Simmel, Georg, How is Society Possible? in Essays on Sociology, Philosophy and Aesthetics, transl. and ed. by Wolff, K. (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1959), p. 243Google Scholar.

(13) See Zijderveld, Anton C., The Abstract Society. A cultural analysis of our time (New York, Doubleday, 1970)Google Scholar.

(14) Schutz, , Collected Papers, I, p. 232Google Scholar.

(15) Ibid. p. 43.

(16) Ibid. p. 53.

(17) Ibid. p. 44. See also p. 64.

(18) I owe the formulation of this problem to a discussion I had with Professor M. Joseph Smucker, Ph.D., Montréal. I am of course responsible for the theoretical elaboration of it.

(19) Blumer, , “What is Wrong with Social Theory ?” Symbolic Interactionism, op. cit. pp. 140–52Google Scholar.

(20) Ibid. p. 170.

(21) Ibid. p. 152.

(22) Following Schutz we use the terms ‘typifications’, ‘concepts’, ‘thought objects’ and ‘thought constructs’ alternatively.

(23) Schutz too has fallen victim to ideological abuse. He was once described to me as “the first hip-philosopher of America…”

(24) Blumer, , op. cit. p. 147 sq. Italics are mineGoogle Scholar.

(25) Ibid. p. 149.

(26) We cannot engage here in a discussion of the critical debate around Blumer's notion of sensitizing concepts.

(27) See, for the problem of relevance, Schutz, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, op. cit.

(28) Here again we must take into account ideological frames of reference. A neo-Marxist theoretical model has more use for the sensitizing concept “dialectical nature of social reality” than a neo-Positivist model, whereas a Roman Catholic social theorist might be less hesitant to use the concept “natural law” than a neo-Positivist sociologist would conceivably be.

(29) Cf. Berger, P. L. and Luck-Mann, Th., The Social Construction of Reality (New York, Doubleday, 1966)Google Scholar.