Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 2
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Bermúdez, Sandra and Cordero, Guillermo 2016. Who is recruiting our crew? Contextual determinants of MPS’ selection. Acta Politica,


    Raymond, Christopher and Holt, Jacob 2014. Due North? Do American Theories of Legislative Committees Apply to Canada?. The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 20, Issue. 2, p. 174.


    ×

Electoral incentives, party discipline, and legislative organization: manipulating legislative committees to win elections and maintain party unity

  • Naofumi Fujimura (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755773911000166
  • Published online: 11 July 2011
Abstract

Political parties are often faced with seemingly opposing goals when trying to secure members’ reelection and maintain party unity. On one hand, a party needs to fulfill members’ diverse electoral needs for their reelection, and on the other hand, the party must force members to vote in unison according to party lines for collective decisions. How does a party influence its members to take unified action while meeting their individual electoral needs? Through an analysis of the Japanese Diet, this study argues that parties attempt to achieve the reelection of their members and maintain party unity by manipulating legislative committee assignments and deliberations. In particular, the study demonstrates that a party shapes committees in a different way according to policy areas over which committees have jurisdiction. A party tends to accept its members’ requests for affiliation and allow their self-management in committees concerned with particularistic benefits so that they can deliver specific benefits to each electoral district. In addition, a party tends to assign members who have average policy positions in the party to committees concerned with general benefits to make policies that satisfy many constituencies.

Copyright
Corresponding author
* E-mail: fujimura@emerald.kobe-u.ac.jp
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

J.H. Aldrich (1995), Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

K. Bawn M.F. Thies (2003), ‘A comparative theory of electoral incentives: representing the unorganized under PR, plurality and mixed-member electoral systems’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(5): 532.

B. Cain , J. Ferejohn M. Fiorina (1987), The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

J.M. Carey (2007), ‘Comparing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting’, American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 92107.

R. Carroll H.A. Kim (2010), ‘Party government and the “Cohesive Power” of public plunder’, American Journal of Political Science 54(1): 3444.

B.F. Crisp , M.C. Escobar-Lemmon , B.S. Jones , M.P. Jones M.M. Taylor-Robinson (2009), ‘The electoral connection and legislative committees’, Journal of Legislative Studies 15(1): 3552.

T.W. Gilligan K. Krehbiel (1990), ‘Organization of informative committees by a rational legislature’, American Journal of Political Science 34(2): 531564.

K. Krehbiel (1991), Informational and Legislative Organization, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

K.A. Shepsle B.R. Weingast (1981), ‘Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice’, Public Choice 37(3): 503509.

T. Stratmann M. Baur (2002), ‘Plurality rule, proportional representation, and the German Bundestag: how incentives to pork-barrel differ across electoral systems’, American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 506514.

K. Strøm (1990), ‘A behavioral theory of competitive political parties’, American Political Science Review 34(2): 565598.

B.R. Weingast W.J. Marshall (1988), ‘The industrial organization of congress; or why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets’, Journal of Political Economy 96(1): 132163.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

European Political Science Review
  • ISSN: 1755-7739
  • EISSN: 1755-7747
  • URL: /core/journals/european-political-science-review
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Keywords: